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In frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise
of wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression lies
1
ordinarily the greatest peril.

INTRODUCTION
It is time to reimagine the fundamental right of access to the
courts.
In recent years, congressional backlash against structural reform
litigation has led to ever-increasing limitations on an individual’s
ability to challenge government policy and the authority of federal
2
courts to redress constitutional harms. It is no coincidence that
innovative methods of curtailing court access have developed in areas
that have experienced the most public law litigation:
the
maintenance of prisons and jails, the delivery of welfare services, the
handling of immigration matters, and the administration of the death
penalty. These restrictions range from procedural to substantive:
monetary relief for some categories of constitutional injuries suffered
by inmates has been abolished, special rules for effectuating remedies
in cases of institutional grievances have been enacted, and harsh new
limits have been imposed on the availability of the writ of habeas
3
corpus. Which of these enactments represent a legitimate exercise
of legislative authority over the scope of judicial power and which
impermissibly impair the venerable right of access?
The time is right to rethink the very concept of access, moreover,
because the right itself has never fully blossomed. Since the high
4
water mark of the Supreme Court’s court access jurisprudence, a

1. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Federal Court observers have identified two distinctive models of
adjudication: the private “dispute resolution” model and the “public law” or
structural reform model. The traditional or “dispute resolution” model centers on
the resolution of controversies that involve only the interests of those immediately
before the court, and is predominantly retrospective in function. The public law
model of legal decision-making, by contrast, focuses on vindicating public values,
including constitutional principles, and has a unique forward-looking character.
When the legal system must decide questions involving constitutional principles, it
often employs distinct rules and casts the parties and the court into entirely different,
and often controversial, roles. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Social
and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 125 (1982)
[hereinafter Fiss, Social and Political Foundations]; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice].
3. Recent examples include a legislative ban on damages arising from inmate
lawsuits unless the underlying conduct caused “physical injury,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), and a general one-year statute of limitations on writs of
habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
4. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (holding that fundamental right of
access required prison authorities to assist inmates to prepare and file legal
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series of disappointing decisions have followed which collectively
5
Recent
undermine the notion of meaningful access.
pronouncements from the Court in this area have rendered the right
6
in many contexts to be little more than an empty shell. Today, the
7
ideal of access is unfulfilled and desiccated; it borders on irrelevance.
Let us breathe new life into the right of access. This Article
proposes a “speech-centered” theory of court access that treats an
individual’s efforts to secure her constitutional rights as the
equivalent
of
engaging
in
anti-government
expression.
Constitutional litigation constitutes “anti-government” expression in
the broadest sense: the speaker questions the legitimacy of a
8
governmental action. This Article suggests that a civil rights litigant
who challenges official policy in court is best understood as a political
9
dissident, regardless of that party’s ideology. In this narrative, the

documents); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (ruling that right of court
access requires waiver of fees for indigents who seek divorce).
5. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (rejecting argument that due
process requires provision of counsel to indigents for discretionary appeals or
applications for review in Supreme Court); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)
(restricting fee waiver for indigent litigants to actions involving fundamental rights).
6. See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001) (holding that prisons may,
consistent with right of access, ban assistance of jail house lawyers); Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (ruling that inmate cannot state claim for violation of right
of court access unless his efforts to litigate non-frivolous legal claim was actually
hindered).
7. The right of access to judicial processes is in danger of falling out of the
constitutional canon. See JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
1316-21 (9th ed. 2001) (devoting total of 6 pages of 1400+ page treatise to topic of
access to courts); DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 366-67 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing cases under topic of
“wealth” classification in 2 pages); CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND RECONSTRUCTION 773 (2001) (mentioning right of access in three
sentences). The most sustained treatments of the topic in any constitutional law
treatise can be found in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 833-50 (2001),
and KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 838-48 (14th
ed. 2001).
8. In this Article, the phrases “constitutional litigation” and “right to seek
redress” are used interchangeably in an effort to harmonize disparate bodies of
scholarship and to underscore the politically significant, even controversial, aspects
of actions for relief from allegedly unconstitutional government practices. I employ
these terms here broadly to discuss the structure and ethos of the process by which
constitutional norms are clarified and made concrete. I am fully aware that these
phrases, individually, have more specific connotations: “Constitutional litigation”
can mean simply the mechanics involved in litigating a constitutional claim in the
courts; the “right of redress,” in the course of ordinary litigation, deals with
compensating injured parties for a garden variety tort or breach of contract.
9. I use the term “civil rights plaintiff” as a shorthand for litigants who file suits
primarily to vindicate their constitutional rights, even though 42 U.S.C. § 1983
authorizes suits against state actors for deprivation of rights arising under “the
Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The distinction between statutory
civil rights actions and constitution-based lawsuits is not a hard and fast one, as many
of the federal civil rights laws were enacted explicitly to enforce and extend
constitutional guarantees. Additionally, while many of the concepts discussed in this
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government-defendant plays the role of an authoritarian power, whose
10
policies must be condemned, exposed, and ultimately reformed.
Grounded in political theory, this model holds that access to the
courts must be ensured because the expression of anti-establishment
sentiment in that forum is critical to the health of our deliberative
democracy.
Part I of this Article argues that the First Amendment, consistent
with the text and structure of the Constitution, facilitates critique and
reformation of the state. An individual’s right to criticize state policy
and petition public officials for redress historically has been linked
11
with struggles over authority between the branches of government.
It is fitting that the First Amendment safeguards the gateway to the
courts, where similar battles over state policy and enduring principles
unfold.
Part II revisits the leading cases establishing the modern right to
litigate constitutional claims as a means of engaging in dissident
speech. It traces the evolution of the concept of constitutional
litigation from the mechanical act of enforcing an individual’s rights,
to an inchoate form of political speech, and finally to a distinct mode
of anti-government expression. Special attention is paid to the
12
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
to invalidate a federal law that banned legal services attorneys from
13
challenging existing welfare laws on behalf of their clients. The
Court struck down this provision on free speech grounds, concluding
that Congress “may not design a subsidy to effect this serious and
fundamental restriction on the advocacy of attorneys and the
14
functioning of the judiciary.” Although Velazquez is assuredly a public
subsidy case, it also breaks important new ground in the law of court
access by explicitly coupling the concept of constitutional litigation as

Article appear to apply equally well to rules of criminal procedure, see Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 16 (1989) (holding that Constitution demands that “accused
and convicted persons be permitted to seek legal remedies without arbitrary
governmental interference”), there are many considerations—the importance of
finality, for one, and respect for state court judgments, for another—that may very
well justify different kinds of rules in the criminal context. I therefore leave, as a
topic for future exploration, the extent to which the First Amendment limits the
kinds of rules that may be enacted which affect defendants’ rights.
10. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (explaining that the government
can never seek to insulate itself from its subjects, even when a government’s citizens
question its very existence).
11. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921)
(documenting a historical map of the judiciary).
12. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
13. Id. at 537.
14. Id. at 544. The remaining restrictions, which were challenged unsuccessfully
in the Second Circuit, were not addressed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 549.
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speech with the Court’s adjudicative task.
Part III explores the characteristics of dissent and the policies that
have traditionally justified First Amendment protection of antiestablishment speech. A detailed comparison is made between the
classic contrariant and the contemporary civil rights plaintiff. This
Part concludes that the nature of the plaintiff-dissident’s expressive
endeavor and the process of constitutional decision-making reinforce
16
the complainant’s role in public life.
Part IV addresses the doctrinal implications for a speech-oriented
model of access. There are many situations where a deeper
appreciation of the right of meaningful access could lead to different
results. I examine one scenario in particular: Congress’ decision to
limit the amount of attorneys’ fees available in successful prisoners’
rights actions. After reviewing the legislative history and impact of
this law on constitutional litigation, I conclude that this fees cap
unduly hampers an inmate-plaintiff’s ability to bring constitutional
17
challenges to existing law.
I.

THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE STATE AUTHORITY
A. Reimagining the Ideal of Access

A preliminary inquiry is in order: Why reflect upon the nature of
constitutional litigation when considering the right to court access?
Further, does conceptualizing constitutional litigation as antigovernment speech have any value? There are three initial reasons
for embarking on this project.
First and foremost, a fresh perspective is important because
existing scholarly materials and case law reflect an inadequate
understanding of the right of access. The right is not treated
seriously as a basic right, although it is nominally characterized as
one. Even when its importance is acknowledged, courts and
18
commentators are not in accord as to the scope of this right. This
Article offers an alternative doctrinal basis for the right to meaningful
access by linking the importance of court access to a modern
understanding of anti-establishment speech.

15. See id. at 548-49.
16. See infra Part III.D.2.
17. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
18. See infra Part I.C (describing various constructions of right of access). The
“right of access to meaningful adjudication” is traditionally understood to emanate
from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1461-63 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing access in terms of
equality of treatment and opportunity to be heard).
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Second, it is valuable to think about constitutional litigation as
quintessential dissent. When courts fail to appreciate the dynamic
character of constitutional litigation, they may overlook the possibility
that laws restricting the assertion of one’s rights may be speech19
curbing in nature. The simplicity of the norms-enforcing narrative
lures courts into thinking that as long as their doors remain open for
business, nothing more needs to be done to assure equal and
20
meaningful access. This attitude, in turn, infects the legal analysis
when questions of court access are involved.
The prevailing First Amendment approach, for better or worse,
requires a court to classify speech, regulated by a challenged
enactment, according to certain established categories, to estimate
the probable scope of the law, and to analyze the law in light of the
21
peculiar set of rules that are protective of speech. Therefore, the
initial effort by a court to classify the speech at issue and “size up” the
impact of a given law on speech has profound consequences on how
the court evaluates the constitutional questions presented. How a
court categorizes expression determines the protection that it is
accorded; a court’s failure to recognize fully the chilling effect of a
rule, at this first step, usually spills over to later stages of the court’s
22
analysis. Treating the pursue of redress as dissent marks its role as
the gateway to the political-legal order by linking familiar, timehonored free speech concepts with a rich understanding of the civil

19. See supra note 2 (describing the possible models of constitutional speech and
the dangers associated with each model).
20. See, e.g., Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding
restrictions on attorneys’ fees for prison litigation on the grounds that it “does not
preclude any prisoner from actually bringing a claim”).
21. This may be an oversimplification. First Amendment jurisprudence is best
considered as a pastiche of overlapping principles, categories, and rules of thumb
intended to be protective of expression. One such principle is the presumption
against content-based rules or those enacted to address the effect of words on a
particular audience; another is the requirement of a close fit between means and
ends when free expression is at issue. At the same time, there is an enduring instinct
to distinguish between categories of speech and give expression varying degrees of
protection. Speech is often conceptualized as a seamless continuum with political
speech at the most protected end of the spectrum; commercial speech
uncomfortably somewhere in the middle; and obscenity, child pornography, fighting
words, and speech posing a “clear and present danger” at the opposite end of the
spectrum, where they are afforded no protection at all. See, e.g., United States v.
Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing a “constitutional continuum”
where different types of speech are distributed). The classification process has been
roundly criticized. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to
Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 693 (1983) (criticizing categorical approaches
to speech as “too abstract and too reductionist”).
22. See Hilton, 167 F.3d at 71 (remarking that the Court’s reluctance to abandon
statutory authority for constitutional principles is grounded in notion that “deciding
Constitutional questions in the abstract is a recipe for making bad law”) (quoting
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 781 (1982)).
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rights plaintiff’s role in constitutional discourse. If internalized, this
method may break down the courts’ bureaucratic impulse to treat a
lawsuit raising constitutionally-based claims as simply another matter
to be cleared from the court docket.
The third value to this approach is that it enhances our collective
appreciation for the complexities of constitutional decision-making.
The rhetoric of the legal opinion, in its persistent refusal openly to
acknowledge conflict or disorder, endeavors to resolve disputes
cleanly, adjudicate questions finally, and announce authoritative and
firm principles.
Similarly, the official narrative explains
constitutional adjudication as a hermetically sealed, top-down
phenomenon:
when rights are ultimately vindicated, the
24
constitutional order is “restored” or “affirmed” from above. This
norms-enforcing narrative, which emphasizes the end result in a
successful public law action over the actual process, ignores the
reality that constitutional litigation is, by nature, a profoundly
disruptive activity and focuses on actual decisions to the exclusion of
how and why constitutional claims are actually presented.
The process by which constitutional rights are articulated is messy;
battles are lost over fundamental principles for years before they
achieve recognition of a constitutional right. Even when litigants
“win” by achieving a favorable court ruling, they can “lose” in terms of
the real world consequences that flow from pursuing the case, and
what seems natural and logical to one generation of jurists and
25
scholars may be utterly inconceivable to the next generation. An

23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (documenting the return of the
movement supporting the notion of purely free speech in which even antigovernment speech is highly valued).
24. For example, Alexander Hamilton’s hierarchical description of constitutional
adjudication states: “A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as
fundamental law. . . . If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance
between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course,
to be preferred; or in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). A variant on this theme is Justice Roberts’ famous
(and simplistic) description of the process by which constitutional questions are
decided:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the
government has only one duty––to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
25. For a classic account of the multi-layered process of adjudication, especially
where the text of a law or constitutional provision is silent or ambiguous, see
CARDOZO, supra note 11, at 112 (“[L]ogic, and history, and custom, and utility, and
the accepted standards of right conduct, are forces which singly or in combination
shape the progress of the law.”).
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anti-government theory of access not only strives to achieve a
coherent substantive theory, it also explicates and embraces the
richness of the procedure by which fundamental questions actually
are adjudicated. It is principally concerned with the powerful
political and cultural forces that shape the constitutional crises; and
the practical effects of court decisions on the lives of those who are
most affected.
B. The First Amendment: Facilitating Criticism of Authority
To what extent does the Constitution limit the government’s
authority to enact measures that could reasonably deter the exercise
of an individual’s constitutional rights? While Article III is one
source of structural constraints, the First Amendment is another
critical source of countervailing power when lawmakers restrict an
individual’s ability to articulate—or the court’s authority to
26
adjudicate—questions of constitutional law.
Although the subclauses that make up the First Amendment frequently have been
elided by courts and commentators, each embodies separate
fundamental values even while overlapping and weaving a general
framework protecting citizens’ rights to free expression and
27
engagement with government. The rights contained in the First
Amendment sketch the essential participatory expectations of a
citizen of the United States: a citizen reasonably expects that he shall
be allowed to make his views known publicly, congregate with others
free from undue interference by the state, and have intractable
disputes heard and, where appropriate, resolved. As to matters of
faith, the state is obligated to strike an uneasy, but crucial, balance in
preserving this venerable source of dissent: it may neither go so far as
to take sides, nor may the state take steps to inhibit one’s practice of

26. By choosing the First Amendment and discussing its relevance for claims
arising from the Constitution, I do not deny that a right of access to federal court
may very well be implicated when ordinary litigation is at issue. I draw this
distinction, however, because the Constitution’s structure comes into play most
strongly where claims grounded in higher law are raised. Constitutional litigation,
which features a direct attack on government action, embodies important values
consonant with the underlying purpose of the First Amendment, and the Supreme
Court’s rulings support the concept of constitutional litigation as a distinct mode of
expressive conduct. See infra Parts II & III. But see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights, 6 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1206
(1973) (denying that there is “firm basis for inferring that litigation is more
important when directed against governmental than against private violations”).
27. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105 (1980) (illustrating
this framework as consisting of the premise that strong language, for example, must
be taken seriously).
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religion, for example.
As others have noted, the First Amendment serves a crucial
purpose related to self-government:
it ensures the necessary
preconditions to keep the political process open, accessible and
29
accountable.
The First Amendment, therefore, has a distinct
political flavor, and indeed, a deeply ingrained anti-government
30
streak. Free speech embodies anti-government values in the sense
31
that the constitutional order tolerates dissent over consensus; our
political-legal structure favors uncertainty and discord in the hope of
retaining the dynamic capacity for transformative politics, rather than
32
clinging to stability for its own sake.
Finally, the Constitution
ensures that the voice of the individual may be expressed, even when
33
the words may be uncomfortable for the majority of citizens to hear,
and despite the prospect that the ideas may actually undermine the
34
work of those in positions of power.
C. Protecting Court Access as a Way of Ensuring Dissent
What are the contours of a properly conceived First Amendment
right to constitutional redress? Recent commentators focusing
exclusively on the Petition Clause have recovered its rich history, but
few have articulated a coherent theory for protecting the right of
35
access to the courts. Professors Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, who

28. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989).
29. See generally ELY, supra note 27, at 105-34 (arguing that First Amendment is
“critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process”);
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 6
(1948) [hereinafter FREE SPEECH] (propounding a consent-based theory of First
Amendment under which open debate is justified because “[r]ulers and ruled are
the same individuals”); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (1966) (“The principle of open discussion is a method of
achieving a more adaptable and at the same time more stable community.”).
30. See EMERSON, supra note 29, at 11 (discussing dissident qualities of speech).
31. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A] function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.”).
The
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause also have a legacy rooted in
dissent by minimizing government’s role in the sphere of religious faith and values.
See generally JOHN M. MECKLIN, THE STORY OF AMERICAN DISSENT 344 (1934) (arguing
that “[t]he single greatest contribution of the dissenting tradition to American life is
the separation of church and state”).
32. See EMERSON, supra note 29, at 11-12 (arguing that opposition speech, “serves
a vital social function in offsetting or ameliorating th[e] normal process of
bureaucratic decay”).
33. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (stating that in order to allow
First Amendment freedoms to function properly, “our own citizens [in public
debate] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous speech”).
34. See ELY, supra note 27, at 116 (claiming that even anti-establishment speech
should be appreciated as necessary for preserving “the American way”).
35. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access:
A First
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suggest that the First Amendment simply “restates and emphasizes
the federal obligations” under Article III, insist that the Petition
36
Clause “means exactly what it says, and no more.” But this response
begs the question of what it means to ensure that one’s access to the
courts remains largely free and unencumbered, and how one goes
about fulfilling that promise.
Other observers articulate a right to lodge grievances, but deprive
the right of much force by conceiving that the right of access applies
37
only to rules that hinder one’s initial ability to lodge complaints.
Professor Carol Rice Andrews, for one, favors a “narrow definition of
the right,” conceiving of the right to invoke the legal process as no
more than “[t]he right of an individual or group to file a winning
38
claim within the court’s jurisdiction.” Professor Andrews argues that
“the right of access is one of initial access only,” and that
“government may deny the claim or limit the substantive cause of
action or remedy, free from any concerns under the First
39
Amendment.”

Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665 (2000) [hereinafter Andrews, Motive
Restrictions] (discussing the impact of the Petition Clause on various court rules and
other laws that tend to limit access to the courts); Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of
Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999) [hereinafter Andrews, A Right of Access] (concluding that
the Petition Clause provides only the limited right to file a winning claim); James E.
Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to
Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899 (1997) (positing
that the Petition Clause “operates as a constitutional antidote to the familiar doctrine
of sovereign immunity”); Kara Elizabeth Shea, San Filippo v. Bongiovanni: The Public
Concern Criteria and the Scope of the Modern Petition Right, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1697 (1995)
(describing historical development of the Petition Clause); Norman B. Smith, “Shall
Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of
Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153 (1986) (tracing right to petition from Medieval
England); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for
Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993)
(analyzing historical context surrounding the Petition Clause); Stephen A.
Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of
Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986) (providing history of the Petition Clause in the
United States and concluding that modern interpretation is inconsistent with
Framers’ intent).
36. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 739, 741, 757-58 (1999).
37. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 54-55 (1985)
(discussing the “external limits” on the jurisdiction-curtailing power of Congress and
finding that many commentators acknowledge in the abstract that the Bill of Rights
limits Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts and then
“proceed to talk as though it had little or no bite.”).
38. Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 35, at 681. Andrews has cogently
identified the potential speech-inhibiting aspects of procedural rules such as Rule 11
sanctions. Accordingly, she concludes that a plaintiff’s motive in filing a lawsuit
should not limit his right to petition the court. Id. at 795.
39. Id. at 681-82.
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Theories of court access that are moored too tightly to the Petition
Clause, like those of Andrews, are unsatisfactory in that they are not
based upon a foundation that draws together other elements of the
First Amendment. Under this admittedly constricted view of the
right of access, only rules that explicitly bar individuals from lodging
winning lawsuits or penalize individuals directly for doing so would
raise First Amendment problems. Creative laws that nevertheless
discourage the assertion of colorable constitutional claims or unduly
complicate the adjudicative endeavor would find no obstacle in the
40
First Amendment.
More problematically, an exclusive focus on
initial access truncates the right in a temporal fashion and does
nothing to assure that access is meaningful: procedural rules that do
not govern the actual initiation of lawsuits, but which might
nevertheless seriously deter the filing of a complaint, would pose no
constitutional difficulty. Nor would legislation that did not explicitly
regulate the procedural rules of court but which rendered the right
of access purely an empty formalism.
Neither the text nor the structure of the Constitution
circumscribes the right of access to redress for constitutional harms
in this way. Although it is essential that any right be articulated with
sufficient precision as to permit meaningful definition and
application, there is no principled reason why the protection of the
First Amendment, robust in other areas, should be so spare when it
comes to safeguarding the fundamental right to seek constitutional
41
redress. There is no clause-bound basis for relegating the Petition
42
Clause subordinate to the Speech or Assembly Clauses.
Words in the Constitution range from the highly specific, such as
the minimum age and residency requirements for any presidential
43
candidate, or the right to a jury trial where “the value in controversy
44
shall exceed twenty dollars,” to the more general, such as the
45
46
guarantees of “due process” and “equal protection of the law.” The

40. While Andrews acknowledges that “a surprising number of statutes outside of
the judicial procedural context impact court access even though that impact is not
the specific aim of the statute,” she does not focus on such problem areas, and her
theory of access is not well suited to addressing such situations. Id. at 671.
41. See Spanbauer, supra note 35, at 16-17 (noting that the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Petition Clause is “cut from the same cloth” as the other rights
afforded by the First Amendment).
42. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (“The Petition Clause . . .
was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to
speak, publish, and assemble . . . [t]hese First Amendment rights are inseparable.”)
(citations omitted).
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
44. Id. at amend. VII.
45. Id. at amends. V; XIV, § 1.
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First Amendment right to petition is not articulated at a level of
47
specificity greater than that of its counterparts. The Framers’ use of
the more general term “Government” in the Petition Clause, rather
than an express limitation on the right to petition a particular branch
of government, suggests a collective desire to codify a broad right to
48
seek redress from the whole of government, including the courts.
In all events, the right to engage in constitutional litigation implicates
associational, petition, and free speech values in ways that are not
49
easily cabined by any particular segment of the text. Theories that
fail to account for the unique qualities of this mode of expression do
50
not provide a sufficient foundation for the right to court access.
Consideration of Article III’s place in our constitutional design
takes us further. Whatever may be said about the duty vel non on the
part of other branches of government to address modern petitions,
Article III, with which the First Amendment must be harmonized, has
been construed to not only to empower the judiciary to address
claims of deprivations of constitutional rights, but also require courts
to remedy violations of individual rights when and where they have
51
occurred. Others have insisted that this is the essence of the judicial

46. Id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that “the equal protection
clause . . . is as specific as the free speech clause . . . but neither is very specific. They
simply contain public values that must be given concrete meaning and harmonized
with the general structure of the Constitution”).
48. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
510 (1972) (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right
of petition.”). As used in other parts of the Constitution, the word “Government”
refers generally to the whole of the ruling structure that the Framers established.
The term “Government” appears in four other places in the founding document to
denote the particular form of government established by the Constitution, or the
broader concept of government generally, or the act of exercising authority. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Executive power to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 3
(mentioning “the Seat of the Government of the United States” in discussing
electoral process for selecting President); id. at art. IV, § 4, (“guarantee[ing] to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government”); id. at amend. XXIII (stating
that the “District constitut[es] the seat of Government of the United States”). The
Drafters used specific terminology when they described the powers lodged
exclusively within “Congress,” any particular house of Congress, or the “President.”
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (providing
one approach to synthesizing various elements of Constitution based on usage of the
same words in different parts of Constitution).
49. See generally Smith, supra note 35 (discussing generally the need to consider
the historical interplay between speech, press, assembly and petitioning for a full
understanding of the scope of these rights).
50. See infra Part II and accompanying notes (describing judicial recognition of
various first amendment underpinnings of constitutional litigation in civil rights
public interest case law).
51. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (citing 3 W.
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 23 (1783)) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that
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52

function. This is not to say that one is entitled to any particular
form of relief, but simply that a right without a remedy would leave
the right to lodge grievances an empty exercise.
Historical practice deepens our understanding of the text. As the
historical record suggests, those who brought their grievances before
the government had a reasonable expectation that their plights
would be addressed whenever possible, and these individuals
frequently employed the language of legal entitlement in their
53
petitions.
Indeed, there exists a scholarly consensus that
government officials felt a “socio-political obligation to hear those
grievances, to provide a response, and often to act upon the
54
complaints,” and it seems perfectly logical to expect that the
Framers had this in mind when they preserved the ancient right to
55
seek redress. The essential gate-keeping dimension of the practice
of petitioning should not be overlooked, as “[t]he right of petition
was both specific—to voice a particular complaint or to solicit a
particular favor—and general: the right’s chief function [is] to
56
protect all other rights.” It is worth noting that historically, the very
act of seeking relief from state policies has been viewed by the state
57
itself as anti-government activity.

where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.”). See generally TRIBE, supra note 37, at 51 (arguing
that congressional enactments “are void to the degree that they leave the Supreme
Court incapable of fulfilling its ‘essential role . . . in the constitutional plan’––the
role of vindicating the supremacy of federal over state law (and of the Constitution
over other sources of federal law) and the uniformity of such federal law as exists.”)
(citations omitted).
52. Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, made this very point:
“[Constitutional] limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
53. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of
the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2174-94 (1998) (discussing importance
that citizens placed on their right to petition during early colonial period).
54. Id. at 2160. Although a few commentators have denied that the Petition
Clause encompasses a right to a response, see, e.g., Andrews, A Right of Access, supra
note 35, at 637-41, others have found that the petitions that were “ignored or
rejected outright . . . were few in number.” Alan Tully, Constituent-Representative
Relationships in Early America: The Case of Pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania, 11 CAN. HIST.
J. 139, 146-47 (1976); see also Higginson, supra note 35, at 142.
55. See Mark, supra note 53, at 2207-12 (discussing the debate in the First
Congress over the inclusion of the Petition Clause).
56. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 23 (1986).
57. For discussions of the history of petitioning as it relates to challenges to
government policy and the treatment of such grievances by governmental bodies, see
generally Mark, supra note 53, at 2153; Pfander, supra note 35, at 899; Smith, supra
note 35, at 1153; Higginson, supra note 35, at 142. In general, “the reactions
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However, history aids only partially in giving contemporary
meaning to the text. Comprehending how previous generations
challenged governmental authority offers insight into both the
importance of the right involved and the circumstances giving rise to
the right at the moment in time at which the right was originally
conceived. Inevitably, however, disputes over how narrowly or
broadly to read the historical record limit the usefulness of history as
58
a self-contained approach to constitutional interpretation. Even if
we can overcome such concerns, the circumstances of a bygone era
should not prevent the words from having modern relevance.
History must join theory for our project to bear fruit. Professor
John Hart Ely’s process-based theory provides a way of thinking about
a First Amendment right to court access that preserves its place
59
within the context of the Constitution as a whole. Professor Ely does
not focus on the Petition Clause, but envisions the First Amendment
broadly to protect the rights embodied in the Amendment, whether
or not they are explicitly mentioned, “because they are critical to the
60
functioning of an open and effective democratic process.”
Politically oriented expression, particularly where it is aimed at the
government or designed to move listeners to take action, must be
tolerated as the price for “assuring an open political dialogue and
61
process.” The overarching design of the Constitution, Professor Ely
insists, is to reinforce, and even strengthen, “the original
62
commitment to control by a majority of the governed.”
This approach enriches a First Amendment theory of court access
in three respects. First, the process-based method warns that to
understand the First Amendment in a manner that is relevant to the
vagaries of modern life, one must not adhere slavishly to a purely
text-based test or an excessively restrictive understanding of original
63
intent to interpret its guarantees. Under the Ely model, where the

generally strengthened the right” to seek extraordinary relief from oppressive or
illegitimate government actions. Mark, supra note 53, at 2171.
58. See generally JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996) (discussing use of history in constitutional
interpretation).
59. See ELY, supra note 27, at 105 (noting that court access, although not expressly
protected in the First Amendment, has a solid foundation in First Amendment
jurisprudence).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 112.
62. Id. at 7.
63. For a provocative discussion of the consequences of the different ways of
using history to give meaning to enduring constitutional principles, see RAKOVE, supra
note 58, at 7-22 (distinguishing between concepts of “original meaning, intent, and
understanding”).
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problem the state attempts to prevent is unrelated to the content of
the message being regulated, a balancing approach involving the
scope of the restriction on speech and governmental interests might
64
make sense. Where the problem that the state seeks to address
arises from the message being conveyed, however, the First
Amendment should broadly “immunize[] all expression save that
65
which falls within a few clearly and narrowly defined categories.”
Whatever criticisms might be leveled at process theory, its principal
thesis that the Bill of Rights serves to broaden democratic
participation counsels in favor of a robust right of court access. In
Professor Ely’s account, the First Amendment must fulfill its “central
66
function of assuring an open dialogue and process.”
Second, a process-based theory of constitutional law suggests that
the First Amendment should be read to protect criticism of
67
government in whatever lawful form that challenge takes.
This
principle applies with particular force to the act of attacking official
governmental policy in the federal courts on the ground that it is
inconsistent with foundational ideals. The focus should not be on
the actual claims placed before the court, but on the effect or
intended effect upon this deeply anti-government form of
68
expression. When rules negatively affect one’s ability to articulate
constitutional claims, or hamper the federal courts in their task of
adjudicating one’s rights, they run the risk of short-circuiting
69
constitutional discourse.
Because the political branches are
generally ill-equipped to handle the multiple ways in which their
policies affect minority rights, constitutional litigation today, more
than ever, is the principal means by which rights are examined,
70
protected, and ultimately refined.

64. See ELY, supra note 27, at 111 (asserting that content neutral regulations
should be evaluated on a specific threat approach).
65. Id. at 110.
66. Id. at 112.
67. See Pfander, supra note 35, at 989 (arguing that Petition Clause should reach
judicial petitions).
68. Some scholars maintain that the key is whether a claim will be successful. See,
e.g., Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 35, at 666 (arguing that the Petition
Clause only grants the right to file winning claims).
69. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 29, at 42 (arguing that First Amendment “was
written to clear the way for thinking which serves the general welfare”).
70. For an illuminating discussion of the reasons as to why federal courts are
particularly well suited to define and articulate constitutional norms, see EMERSON,
supra note 29, at 30-41. Emerson argues that the growth and centralization of the
federal judiciary has caused it to become an effective counterweight to the modern
bureaucratic state. Id. at 36-40. In Emerson’s view, the federal courts are more
insulated from direct majoritarian pressures than their constitutional counterparts.
Id. at 40-41. In addition, judges are likely to possess the “knowledge and wisdom
derived from historical experience, from broad political and social theory, and from
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Third, in related fashion, process theory holds that the
Constitution is designed not only to encourage majority rule, but also
71
to “protect those who can’t protect themselves politically.” In so
doing, the founding framework facilitates the ability of the politically
marginalized to articulate alternative viewpoints and play active roles
72
in public life.
This principle safeguards politically vulnerable
citizens, and treats dissent as a form of disfavored communication.
When we ensure the openness of the legal system, we create
breathing room for the exchange of views on fundamental questions
that some might find immoral, blasphemous, or wrongheaded. But
all of these views are essential to the process by which our
constitutional norms are made relevant in each generation. Where a
rule has been enacted impairing one’s ability to pursue constitutional
claims, “a more serious threat should be required when there is
doubt that the speaker has other effective means of reaching the
73
same audience.”
II. TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ARTICULATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. The Decisions: The Rise of Constitutional Litigation
as a Modern Form of Dissident Speech
Modern First Amendment case law sketches a framework for
protecting the right to pursue constitutional redress as a specialized
form of political speech.
This Part argues that the Court’s
understanding of the act of asserting one’s constitutional rights—
constitutional litigation for lack of a more suitable term—has evolved
from a purely mechanical idea of initiating legal claims to a distinct,
fully identifiable model of anti-government expression. As the
prevailing conception of dissent has evolved, so, too, the First
Amendment has been reconceptualized to protect the expressive
components of this unique form of speech.
In a series of cases, decided at the height of this country’s struggle
over political and legal equality for African-Americans, the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the public law model of

weighing basic values.” Id. at 31.
71. ELY, supra note 27, at 152.
72. See ELY, supra note 27, at 135-79; see also Michelman, supra note 26, at 1175
(suggesting that “[p]articipation values are at the root of the claim that [a right of
court access] can be derived from the first amendment”); see generally Note, A First
Amendment Right to Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973) (arguing
that indigents’ right to access the courts derives from the First Amendment).
73. ELY, supra note 27, at 111.
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litigation as a new form of political speech. In each of these cases,
the political branches erected barriers to court access by preventing
lawyers and clients from associating freely for the purpose of
attacking legal segregation, and each time, the Court knocked down
74
these barriers.
The Court laid the groundwork for a modern First Amendment
right of access by making two critical interpretive moves. First, it
equated constitutional litigation in the courts with dissident speech,
and viewed structural reform as a seamless extension of political
75
strategy. Second, the Court employed the classic First Amendment
test for core political speech to strike down laws that impair one’s
76
effort to associate with others for these politico-legal objectives.
77
In the landmark case of NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court
invoked the First Amendment to invalidate a series of Virginia laws
that prohibited individuals and organizations from soliciting legal
business and advising prospective clients to hire particular
78
attorneys—in this case, counsel cooperating with the NAACP. The
NAACP and its members challenged these laws, many of which were
enacted to deter the NAACP’s systematic efforts to dismantle Jim
79
Crow.
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that these laws
contravened their right to associate freely and petition the
80
government for redress.
The Court granted the requested relief.
Rather than rely
exclusively on any particular sub-clause of the First Amendment, the
Court adopted a holistic approach, embracing concepts related to
free expression, assembly, and petition to safeguard the right to
81
engage in constitutional litigation.
In granting heightened
protection to the group’s public litigation-related activities, the Court
explicitly distinguished actions taken to enforce constitutional
guarantees from activity related to everyday lawsuits seeking
82
83
resolution of purely private disputes. Writing for the Court, Justice

74. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
75. See Button, 371 U.S. at 431 (highlighting virtues of dissident speech by
minority groups and noting that litigation is often the most effective method for
achieving their social and political goals).
76. See id. at 435-37 (holding that right to expression includes right to persuade
others through process of litigation).
77. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
78. Id. at 437.
79. Id. at 435-36.
80. Id. at 428.
81. Id. at 430.
82. See id. at 431 (emphasizing the importance of association to litigation
pursued to further minority viewpoints).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=429380

TSAI.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

7/26/2002 12:33 PM

A SPEECH-CENTERED THEORY OF COURT ACCESS

853

Brennan acknowledged the profoundly communicative aspect of
constitutional litigation:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of
resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful
objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state
and local, for the members of the Negro community in this
84
country. It is thus a form of political expression.

The Court explicitly treated constitutional litigation as
85
“petition[ing] for redress of grievances.” In so holding, the Court
tacitly acknowledged that the deeply rooted social and political
structures in America had frustrated the attainment of the
86
constitutional ideal of racial justice, and that new countervailing
sources of authority were required to fulfill the promise of substantive
87
equality held out by the Fourteenth Amendment. Before political
power could redistribute itself, however, the channels of
communication and democratic participation had to be forced open.
According to this modern perspective of the legal system’s role, “the
judicial process is an effective mechanism for registering and
88
Like the
responding to grievances . . . in a regulatory state.”
petitions of old, constitutional litigation now represented an
innovative device to “force the government’s attention on the claims

83. Justice Douglas would have gone further by holding that Virginia’s antisolicitation laws, like others enacted in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Tennessee after Brown v. Board of Education, “reflect[] a legislative
purpose to penalize the NAACP because it promotes desegregation of the races.”
Button, 371 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 217-22 (1994) (“virtually every Southern state passed laws
and started legislative investigations, criminal prosecutions, suits for injunction, and
disbarment proceedings against lawyers to put the NAACP and LDF out of
business”). Justice White concurred with the majority’s decision on narrower
grounds, finding that the law prohibited organizations from recommending certain
attorneys and was therefore overbroad. Button, 371 U.S. at 447 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
84. Button, 371 U.S. at 429.
85. Id. at 430. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, the Court
reaffirmed the essence of Button: within the American form of government, “the
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make
their wishes known by their representatives,” and the right to petition “extends to all
departments of the Government.” 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
86. See Button, 371 U.S. at 429 (recognizing that legal strategy is often closely tied
to political strategy because “[g]roups which find themselves unable to achieve their
objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts”).
87. See id. at 430 (acknowledging that right to associate for purpose of
constitutional litigation stems from a broad, collective reading of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
88. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1308. In explaining the advent of public interest
lawyering, Professor Chayes argued that “the growth of judicial power has been, in
large part, a function of the failure of other agencies to respond to groups that have
been able to mobilize considerable political resources and energy.” Id. at 1313.
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of the governed when no other mechanism could.”
A second reason delineated by the Button Court for understanding
constitutional litigation as political expression was that by organizing
themselves around certain specific expressive goals—in this instance,
“vindicating the rights of the American Negro community,”—the
NAACP’s members made a “distinctive contribution . . . to the ideas
90
and beliefs of our society.”
This amounted to a significant
broadening of the understanding of political expression under the
First Amendment. By associating with like-minded persons and
challenging allegedly unconstitutional governmental practices in the
courts, the NAACP actively engaged in debate on issues of public
91
importance in a manner not unlike “a conventional political party.”
In an important third analytical maneuver, the Court observed
that, especially for minority groups without the means to effect
change within the ordinary political process, “association for
92
litigation may be the most effective form of political association.” In
a remarkable appreciation of both the limitations of interest group
politics and the difficulty in vindicating individual rights within such
constraints, the Court explained that “under the conditions of
modern government, litigation may well be the sole practical avenue
93
open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.”
94
In re Primus, which arose out of the state of South Carolina’s
attempt to discipline a public interest lawyer for soliciting and
advising prospective clients, provided the Court with another critical
opportunity to delineate the First Amendment right to seek
transformative change through the legal process. Taking the Button
analysis one step further, the Court distinguished between lawsuits
filed purely “for pecuniary gain” and legal actions “undertaken to
95
express political beliefs and to advance . . . civil-liberties objectives.”
The right to pursue redress for violations of constitutional rights, the
Court went on to explain, “comes within the generous zone of the
First Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms” and

89. Mark, supra note 53, at 2157.
90. Button, 371 U.S. at 431.
91. Id.
92. See id.(“We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind
of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek
through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity
under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly.”).
93. Id. at 430.
94. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
95. Id. at 422. Like the NAACP, the ACLU was deemed to engage in
constitutional litigation, “a form of political expression” and “political association.”
Id. at 428.
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involves the “communicati[on] [of] useful information to the
96
public.”
Particularly important, the Primus Court expressly treated
constitutional litigation as contrariant speech, singling out
“unpopular” subject matters on which the ACLU often found itself at
odds with public opinion and governmental policy. Included were
“political dissent, juvenile rights, prisoners’ rights, military law,
97
amnesty, and privacy.” In a candid acknowledgment of the serious
difficulties faced by indigent litigants, the Court stated that “the
efficacy of litigation as a means of advancing the cause of civil
liberties often depends on the ability to make legal assistance
98
available to suitable litigants,” and affirmed the principle that the
First Amendment extends beyond the mere exchange of ideas, and
99
includes the right to seek their lawful implementation.
These decisions, working in tandem, established a nascent First
Amendment right of court access by acknowledging the
communicative nature of structural reform litigation. At the same
time, however, these decisions provided an incomplete foundation
for a speech-centered theory of access. Although the Court grasped
the crucial role that lawyers play within our adversarial process of
constitutional adjudication, Button and Primus involved only the right
to solicit clients for public law litigation—in other words, pre100
litigation activity.
Similarly, the Court’s due process cases focused
on the extent to which excessive fees barred access to the courts in
101
the first place. Neither line of cases considered the significance of
102
meaningful access once constitutional litigation has commenced.
The Rehnquist Court’s recent ruling in Velazquez goes a long way
103
toward filling that void.

96. Id. at 424.
97. Id. at 428.
98. Id. at 431.
99. See id. at 432 (“‘Free trade in ideas’ means free trade in the opportunity to
persuade to action, not merely to describe facts.”) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 537 (1945)).
100. In Primus, for example, the appellant was a cooperating attorney for the
ACLU who advised women of their legal rights regarding sterilization and was
thereafter disciplined for violating ethical rules. See id. at 412.
101. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.10 (3d ed. 1999) (offering a comprehensive discussion of
the due process right to access in light of excessive fees).
102. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that a state violated
due process and equal protection by denying an indigent woman the ability to appeal
from a trial court determination permanently terminating her parental rights solely
because she could not afford to pay for a transcript of the trial proceedings).
103. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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B. The Velazquez Decision and Beyond
In Velazquez, the Court took a powerful step toward recognizing a
First Amendment right to litigate questions of constitutional law
effectively, announcing that rules which effectively impair the
advocacy of constitutional claims or which were intended to “distort”
the process of constitutional adjudication run afoul of the First
104
Amendment.
At issue in Velazquez was the constitutionality of
certain advocacy restrictions imposed on LSC lawyers by Congress in
1996.
Specifically, § 504(a)(16) of the Act prohibited the
expenditure of federal funds in “litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking,
105
involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system.”
The Second Circuit had struck down § 504(a)(16) as unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination to the extent that it forbade LSC attorneys
from challenging “existing law” on behalf of their clients, concluding
that Congress impermissibly “s[ought] to discourage challenges to
106
the status quo.”
107
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision.
Justice Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, began by characterizing
the efforts by LSC attorneys to engage in structural reform litigation
as “private” speech, even though it was funded through public
108
monies.
From this starting point, he reasoned that congressional
attempts to circumscribe constitutional litigation amounted to
109
regulation of private speech.
The majority was troubled by the

104. Id. at 537.
105. Id. at 538 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3(a) (1999)
(“Prohibited activities include participation in: (a) Litigation challenging laws or
regulations enacted as part of an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system.”);
id. § 1639.4 (“Recipients may represent an individual eligible client who is seeking
specific relief from a welfare agency, if such relief does not involve an effort to
amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of
the representation.”).
106. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 770 (2d Cir. 1999).
107. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 549.
108. See id. at 542 (explaining that LSC was designed to facilitate private speech
and not to promote a governmental objective).
109. See id. (pointing out that LSC attorney speaks on behalf of client, not
government). On this basis, the Court distinguished Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991), which had upheld a provision that barred doctors who received Title X funds
from advising patients about abortion. Rather tenuously, the Velazquez Court
continued to regard the abortion advice gag order as a legitimate limitation on
“governmental speech.” Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 540-42. In drawing a razor fine
distinction between the kinds of speech at issue, the Court refused to acknowledge
that limits on speech in both cases had a powerful capacity to distort the professional
advice and services upon which the clients’ health or welfare depended. Rust has
been so regularly condemned that appellees’ counsel suggested that the Court
overrule the decision. See Brief for Respondent at 19 n.17, 2000 WL 991809, Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (No. 99-603).
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statute’s provisions “foreclos[ing] advice or legal assistance to
question the validity of statutes under the Constitution of the United
110
States,” which the Court read to forbid LSC attorneys from
challenging or questioning laws as inconsistent with the
111
Not only did the restriction
constitutional rights of their clients.
violate the principle of speech neutrality, it undermined the
112
adjudicative function of the federal courts.
Analogizing to the
Court’s previous First Amendment decisions in the area of
broadcasting and student newspapers, the majority held that a
lawyer’s advocacy to contest the constitutionality of government laws
and policies was “inherent in the nature of the medium” of speech,
and that the challenged restrictions impermissibly “alter[ed] the
traditional role of attorneys” and “distort[ed] [the] usual
113
functioning” of the legal system.
The Court characterized the
provision, without further elaboration, as “inconsistent with accepted
114
separation-of-powers principles.”
1.

Tethering the right of court access to the judicial function
As a preliminary matter, one should view the events leading to the
passage of the provision, as well as the decision ultimately striking it
down, against the broader backdrop of institutional struggle. The
opinion of the Court did not explicitly distinguish between
lawmakers’ motivations in enacting § 504(a)(16) and the effect of the
115
restrictions at issue; rather it discussed both interchangeably.
Nevertheless, the restrictions were formulated and approved in an

110. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 546.
113. Id. at 544.
114. Id. at 546. Justice Kennedy explained that “[b]y seeking to prohibit the
analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts, the
enactment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must
depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power.” Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
115. Much of the decision emphasizes the improper effects of curtailing the
publicly funded attorney’s speech (i.e., his advocacy), altering the traditional role of
counsel, and affecting the court’s work. Id. at 544-48. At other points in the ruling,
the Court focuses on Congress’ intended purposes. See id. at 545 (“By seeking to
prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts,
the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts
must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power.”). Its conclusion that
“Section 504(A)(16) sifts out cases presenting constitutional challenges in order to
insulate the Government’s laws from judicial scrutiny” seems, at first glance, a
mixture of the two concepts. Id. at 546. Because the provision actually does not
deprive courts of the power to decide questions of constitutional law, this rationale
seems more sensibly read as saying the lawmaking branches have unconstitutionally
tried to insulate the law from judicial review. This suggests that in certain
circumstances the First Amendment may serve as a more substantial barrier against
encroachments on the right of access than does Article III.
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environment where legislators repeatedly questioned the propriety of
public service attorneys in questioning existing welfare rules through
class action lawsuits, and attacked litigants who sought enforcement
116
Observers understood that the
of their constitutional rights.
congressional restrictions on LSC activity had everything to do with
plaintiffs’ successes in obtaining structural reform of the welfare
system and the willingness of federal courts to entertain welfare
117
recipients’ claims.
A majority of the Justices certainly viewed the ideal of an
118
independent Judiciary to be under attack. In a dramatic display, the
judiciary reasserted its prerogative to define the parameters within
which the judicial function is to be performed. The fact that the
Court invoked the separation of powers doctrine and characterized
the provision as an attempt to “insulate” some congressional
enactments from judicial review, all under the rubric of the First
Amendment, conveyed the Court’s belief that the law encroached
upon its core judicial authority, however indirect the means and
however ineffective it was in actually circumscribing the Court’s zone
119
of influence.
That five members of the Court deemed this case to affect their
institutional power is evidenced by their decision to reach back to
120
Marbury v. Madison to reestablish their authority to decide questions
121
of law.
In doing so, the Court signaled that Congress had, by
enacting these limits on lawyers, invaded “the sphere of its authority
122
to resolve a case or controversy.”
These are strong sentiments,
particularly where the lawmaking branches had not explicitly
stripped the courts of jurisdiction to entertain questions of
constitutional law, but instead had simply prevented some federally
123
funded lawyers from raising such claims.
By invoking the

116. See Jessica A. Roth, Note, It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A Constitutional
Challenge to the 1996 Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 107, 107 (1998) (noting that LSC recipients were prohibited from engaging in
reform litigation, challenging executive or agency orders, or encouraging political
participation).
117. See id. at 108 (noting that congressional restrictions on LSC activities were
primarily targeting “political” lawsuits, including those lawsuits that were instituted
for purpose of reforming welfare system).
118. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546 (“The restriction imposed by the statute here
threatens severe impairment of the judicial function.”).
119. See id. (noting that proposed restrictions would not allow attorneys to seek
resolution from courts regarding questions of statutory validity).
120. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
121. See id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”), cited in Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545.
122. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545.
123. When the lawmaking branches have more obviously attempted to strip
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“separation of powers” doctrine in this context, the Court broke
124
important new ground in the law of court access.
In turning aside what it viewed as a direct challenge to its authority,
the judiciary expanded its sphere to encompass the power not only to
interpret the Constitution in an authoritative manner, but also to
govern lawyers’ and parties’ capacities to articulate constitutional claims
intelligently and to monitor the quality of court access. To secure this
victory over the other branches of government, the Court embraced
an almost entirely lawyer-dependent model of constitutional
adjudication, where the quality of the decisions reached, and perhaps
the legitimacy of the results obtained, depends largely on the
125
information and ideas provided by the parties and their counsel.
2.

Treating constitutional litigation as dissident speech
As with prior struggles over institutional prerogative, the latest
inter-branch conflict further delineated the scope of public access to
the courts—this time, by expanding the individual right of access.
Embedded within the Velazquez decision are several concepts that
reinvigorate a substantive, speech-centered theory of access.
One key to the ruling is the Court’s unspoken assumption that the
articulation of constitutional claims amounts to dissident speech.
While the majority did not explicitly invoke the anti-government
speech line of cases, its analysis leaves no doubt that constitutional
litigation should be equated with anti-government speech for
purposes of First Amendment analysis. There is no sense in
understanding § 504(a)(16) as viewpoint discrimination unless
litigation within “existing law” is seen as one opinion on the broader
subject of government authority (i.e., the official policy at issue is
valid or constitutional or consistent with fundamental principles),

federal courts of jurisdiction over certain subject matters, the Court’s reaction has
been more muted. The Court has taken refuge in the “clear statement” rule to avoid
interpreting an arguably ambiguous statute so as to withdraw jurisdiction, and hence,
refrain from addressing any constitutional questions. See, e.g., Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that federal courts
have jurisdiction over an alien’s petition for federal writ of habeas corpus and that an
alien convicted via plea bargain who would have been eligible for waiver under
212(c) was entitled to a discretionary waiver under that section). There are two
explanations for this phenomenon. First, the Court, where possible, will opt for the
most effective way of avoiding constitutional conflict while still vindicating its
authority. Second, the Court will be most tempted to sound a ringing defense of its
prerogative when the stakes are not as high, that is, when doing so will not seriously
call into doubt its own legitimacy.
124. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority’s
decision was “inexplicable on the basis of our prior laws”).
125. See id. at 545 (affirming the principle that “[a]n informed, independent
judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar”).
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while constitutional litigation represents a different perspective on
the same topic (i.e., the policy is inconsistent with other laws, basic
126
After all, viewpoint discrimination
rights, or founding values).
occurs when the state either favors or disfavors a privately expressed
perspective. As Justice Scalia points out in dissent, the provision does
not distinguish between the kinds of constitutional arguments that can
be made by LSC lawyers, but precludes all forms of constitutional
127
litigation funded by government coffers.
3.

Safeguarding the channels for the transmission of constitutional values
Another important development in access jurisprudence is the
Velazquez ruling’s extension of free speech protection to laws or rules
128
that inhibit the free flow of information to the courts.
Unlike
conventional public fora where ideas compete for attention and
where false or frivolous notions may triumph over well-founded
points of view, courts are driven by the goals of truth-seeking and
129
The First Amendment ensures court
constitutional adjudication.
access by protecting the integrity of the mechanism by which
constitutional discourse takes place.
Under this reasoning,
restrictions at odds with the judicial process may fail judicial scrutiny,
even when the undertaking is publicly funded.
If the restrictions at issue in Velazquez had the potential to “distort[]
130
the legal system,” then public law activity must be qualitatively
different from other forms of speech, and restrictions burdening the
assertion of such rights must be more skeptically viewed under the
First Amendment than other kinds of speech-curbing laws. This
entire line of reasoning is consistent with a process-based approach to
court access.
The recognition of a plaintiff-dissident’s right to articulate a
constitutional claim, and have the judiciary understand its essence, is
a noteworthy broadening of Button and Primus, which, despite their
analytical force, presented only the narrow question of whether the

126. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (stating that viewpoint discrimination occurs when “the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.”).
127. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting that provision
“funds neither challenges to nor defenses of existing welfare law” and therefore did
not constitute viewpoint discrimination).
128. See id. at 546 (explaining that Congress does not have authority to exclude
issues or information from courts that are “within the province of the courts to
consider”).
129. Id. at 544.
130. Id.
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state could bar or punish individuals for soliciting public interest
131
After Velazquez, it might be said that First Amendment
clients.
protection inheres in the entire structure within which constitutional
litigation occurs. The Court extended the First Amendment’s reach
to one’s effort to obtain accurate legal advice, communicate
effectively with competent counsel, and present the “vital theories
132
and ideas” associated with constitutional claims.
These structural
rationales for striking down the provision are wholly separate from
the finding of viewpoint discrimination.
The Court’s acceptance of the “distortion” rationale under the
circumstances—the restrictions at issue barred only federally-funded
LSC attorneys from raising constitutional claims, leaving the clients
free to assert such claims on their own or to hire lawyers competent
to raise them—only underscores the potential reach of the decision.
A rule or regulation unduly restricting the lawyer’s public litigation
activities may very well have the effect of “distorting” the court’s
ability to receive information about constitutional claims, or
impairing the judiciary’s function of adjudicating constitutional
133
conflicts.
The point at which an enactment or rule unduly
“distorts” the adjudicative process will likely depend on the novelty of
the restriction, the reasons underlying the enactment, and the rule’s
134
impact on a dissident’s ability to articulate her claim.
4.

Court access and the quality of representation
While the Velazquez Court did not explicitly cite Button or Primus,
the spirit of those decisions informed its reasoning in another aspect
as well: it affirmed the principle, first established in those cases, that
lawyers articulating constitutional claims are “necessary to the proper
135
The Court has never ventured very
functioning of th[e] system.”
far down the road of requiring the appointment of attorneys for civil
136
actions.
In fact, the Court stopped short of any suggestion of a


131. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422
(1978).
132. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544 (concluding that statute “forecloses advice or
legal assistance”).
133. Id. at 545 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803)).
134. If the rule of Velazquez is to mean anything, it means that any
“unconventional” law that “suppress[es] speech inherent in the nature of the
medium” of constitutional litigation is presumptively invalid. See id. at 543
(explaining that First Amendment forbids “Government from using the forum in an
unconventional way to suppress speech inherent in the nature of the medium”)
(citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396-97 (1984)).
135. See id. at 544 (referring to the restrictions on advocacy as “serious and
fundamental”).
136. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (finding no
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137

Nevertheless, the Court’s
general right to counsel in Velazquez.
emphasis on the attorney’s role in engaging in this type of protected
138
dissent is significant. First Amendment interests may be implicated
where a law has the effect of preventing or discouraging lawyers from
raising constitutional claims or taking such cases in the first place,
particularly where the public has pursued a policy of providing or
encouraging legal assistance. While there is no guarantee that a
future combination of the Court will be as open to these policy
arguments in a case involving questions of constitutional access, the
effect of a speech-curbing law on the quality of representation might
well make the difference in a close case.
III. THE QUALITIES OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Examining the myriad of ways in which the pursuit of
constitutional causes of action mirrors the expression of antigovernment sentiment enriches our understanding of the
importance of court access. This Part analyzes the nature of
contrarious speech and the reasons that the Court has offered for its
protection of dissent. These values should inform our conception of
the right to court access. This Part continues with an exploration of
the various ways in which the assertion of one’s rights, the rules that
govern the resolution of constitutional disputes, and the process of
adjudication confirm the plaintiff’s role as a dissident in civic life. In
many striking respects, the expressive features of constitutional
litigation track the essential elements of traditional dissent.
As any First Amendment scholar or constitutional lawyer is aware,
the modern First Amendment is understood to ensure that “debate
139
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”
The marketplace of ideas was not always receptive to criticism of the
state, and the right to excoriate one’s leaders or their official policies
has not been consistently protected by the courts, particularly in

constitutional requirement for appointment of counsel in parental rights
termination hearing); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (finding no
constitutional requirement for provision of counsel to inmates in civil actions where
access to court is not at issue).
137. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-47 (discussing importance of the lack of an
alternate source of counsel to those represented by LSC attorneys).
138. See id. (arguing that restrictions on speech and legal advice cast doubt as to
whether LSC counsel can fully advise client and properly present all appropriate
legal issues).
139. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting this
principle was one to which the nation holds a “profound commitment” and
acknowledging that such a commitment will permit harsh criticism of government).
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140

times of war. Nevertheless, over time, courts have gradually become
141
Whereas
more protective of speech that is critical of the state.
142
seditious speech was once punishable consistent with the prevailing
143
understanding of the First Amendment, the right to dissent has
144
become a central element of our shared freedoms.

140. See, e.g., Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (assuming
that “the power to repress [criticism of government] may rest in Congress in the
throes of a struggle for the very existence of the state,” but concluding as a matter of
law that anti-war cartoons did not constitute false statements of fact).
141. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (fashioning a test
which protected, as a form of anti-government expression, advocating the use of
violence to overthrow the state “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
142. By “seditious speech,” I refer to advocacy of the destruction or overthrow of a
particular form of government, unaccompanied by any overt act from which one
could reasonably infer a plan to do imminent violence or harm.
143. In practice, one’s constitutional rights are often curtailed during times of
war. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (affirming convictions based on
advocacy of overthrowing the U.S. government); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325
(1920) (upholding conviction where defendant spoke out against U.S. policy of
conscription during World War I); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919)
(upholding conviction of Socialist party and labor leader who gave speech on
Socialism urging “continuous, active, and public opposition to the war” against
Germany); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming conviction for
circulating flyers, which urged men to resist the draft).
144. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or
disagreeable.”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988) (striking down law that
prohibited displays shielding foreign diplomatic personnel “from signs critical of
their governments”); see also ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE 24 (1968) (describing as “remarkable” that “the individual citizen may
protest governmental actions; that he may bitterly dissent from government policies;
that he may oppose the government itself”). The Court has invoked the right to
criticize the state as the basis for overturning convictions of individuals who burned,
or unconventionally displayed, the American flag as an anti-war expression. See
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating federal law criminalizing
desecration of United States flag); Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (reversing conviction for flag
burning); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (reversing conviction of
individual who hung American flag upside down, with peace symbol affixed, to
protest invasion of Cambodia and shooting of students at Kent State). The Court has
exempted those who refused to recite the Pledge of Allegiance or salute the flag. See
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (declaring that
government cannot require “gestures of acceptance or respect . . . a bowed or bared
head, a bended knee”); Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 835 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding
that standing during Pledge is a “symbolic gesture” that individuals may avoid);
Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973) (same). The Court has also protected
public school students from discipline when they expressed anti-war views in a nondisruptive fashion. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(protecting students’ right to wear black armbands “to exhibit their disapproval of
the Vietnam hostilities and their advocacy of a truce”). In 1966, the Court ordered
the seating of a duly elected member of Congress, who was denied his place because
he criticized American foreign policy in Vietnam. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116,
132, 136 (1966) (holding that “the First Amendment protects expressions in
opposition to national foreign policy and to the Selective Service system” and
“[l]egislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial issues”).
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A. Preventing State-Imposed Uniformity of Sentiment
There are several enduring features of the Court’s jurisprudence
regarding anti-government speech that bear directly on our task of
reconceptualizing the right of court access.
The principal
observation is that in this line of cases, many of which were
influenced by American war efforts against Nazism and Fascism, the
Court frequently equated the suppression of dissent with
authoritarianism. When the state inhibits expression directed at it,
the state acts as a tyrant. Receptivity to political criticism, by contrast,
is understood as the hallmark of a free people and a democratic
system.
As the Supreme Court pronounced in West Virginia State Board of
145
Education v. Barnette, while striking down compulsory flag salute for
schoolchildren as a means of inculcating patriotism, the First
146
Writing
Amendment forbids “coerce[d] uniformity of sentiment.”
in 1943 at the height of World War II, Justice Jackson distinguished
the American form of government from the totalitarian regimes of
the nation’s enemies by affirming the Constitution’s tolerance of antigovernment viewpoints: “Those who begin coercive elimination of
dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
147
graveyard.”
Such laws, the Court reasoned, “invade the sphere of
148
intellect and spirit” protected by the First Amendment.
Therefore, keeping the channels of communication as free as
possible prevents the state from imposing uniformity in thought,
culture, or values, whereas permitting the coercive power of the state
to insinuate itself in these most intimate areas of community and self149
improvement amounts to toleration of tyranny.
As the educator

145. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
146. Id. at 640.
147. Id. at 641. For an analysis of the impact of totalitarianism on the Court’s
rulings, see Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar
Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423 (1996).
148. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; see also Staughton Lynd, Freedom Now: The Intellectual
Origins of American Radicalism, reprinted in DISSENT: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM 16-17 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1968) (discussing 17th Century
dissenters’ belief in “natural right to freedom of conscience”).
149. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (contrasting “individual freedom of mind” with
“officially disciplined uniformity”). This principle is severely tested in times of war.
One socio-cultural explanation is that the impulse toward internal coercion increases
as an external threat emerges, though as Justice Murphy pointed out in his
dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945), the state that
resorts to oppressive methods against its own citizens has trouble credibly
denouncing authoritarianism:
th[e] inference [that individual disloyalty is proof of collective disloyalty],
which is at the very heart of the evacuation orders, has been used in support
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Alexander Meiklejohn explains, suppression of ideas as a way of
avoiding lesser evils results in system-wide disaster, while preservation
of free speech “facilitates the search for and the dissemination of
150
Where matters of public
truth that can keep our country safe.”
interest are at stake, more information is better than less.
This powerful free speech principle, used to justify government
respect for competing points of view, works equally well in protecting
151
access to the federal courts. When the state erects obstacles to the
pursuit of legal redress, government improperly compels the nonconformist to accept the status quo; in making this demand, the state
152
violates the critic’s sense of personal and intellectual autonomy.
B. Enhancing Political Accountability
A second reason the judiciary must be solicitous of contrarian
viewpoints is that criticism of the state preserves the legitimacy and
accountability of the existing political-legal order. Exposure to ideas
153
from “diverse and antagonistic sources” keeps the state honest, and
remains the one sure method of ascertaining whether our
constitutional form of government is, in fact, healthy and
154
deliberative.
On the other hand, by eliminating dissent, the
government improperly restricts the channels through which
155
constitutional dialogue takes place.

of the abhorrent and despicable treatment of minority groups by the
dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to destroy. To give
constitutional sanction to that inference in this case . . . is to adopt one of
the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity of
the individual and to encourage and open the door to discriminatory actions
against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 240.
150. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF 68
(1948).
151. See id. at 91 (applying First Amendment protections to all institutions of
government).
152. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 (criticizing law compelling flag salute as a
measure that “requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).
153. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978); see also Barnette, 319
U.S. at 641 (“Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion
by authority.”).
154. See First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 (noting that speech related to the affairs
of government “is the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a
democracy”).
155. Even during times of armed conflict, what has distinguished our republic
from its more repressive adversaries is the citizen’s right to mount legal challenges to
the government’s wartime policies. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1945) (challenging, unsuccessfully, wartime internment of Japanese-Americans); Ex
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (ordering release of loyal Japanese-American from
detention camp); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding unconstitutional
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the American Civil War); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (enjoining U.S. bombing of
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Consider the majority’s decision in Stromberg v. California, which
reversed the conviction of a young Communist for the peacetime
display of a red flag “as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to
157
organized government.”
The statute at issue troubled the Court
because it prohibited “the peaceful and orderly opposition to
government” by one group “which did not agree with the one in
158
power.”
In striking down the statutory provision, the Court
reasoned that
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute
which . . . permit[s] the punishment of the fair use of this
opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in
159
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because the American form of government derives its authority
from the citizenry (rather than birthright or religious sanction),
individuals must be permitted to critique the state’s conduct so that
the process remains responsive to their needs and official decisions
160
As the majority opinion in
reflect their values and priorities.
Stromberg shows, even disloyal speech that is not directed at any
specific branch of government can, in theory, influence public
opinion, and the individual is entitled to the opportunity to express
161
his view for this reason.
Justice Brandeis observed a similar connection between speech
critical of the government and the fundamental principle of
participatory democracy in dissenting from the Supreme Court’s

Cambodia), rev’d, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding the issue presented to be a
political and not judicial question). Although the overwhelming majority of such
efforts have failed, the very fact that the legal order usually treats these challenges as
worthy of fair resolution enhances our collective respect for controversial speech.
156. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
157. Id. at 361. The defendant was a nineteen-year-old woman and a citizen of the
United States. Id. at 362. The factual basis for her prosecution was that, in her role
as camp counselor, she led the children in a daily exercise where they raised and
saluted the red flag of the Communist Party, which they treated as “the workers’ red
flag.” Id.
158. Id. at 369 (invalidating a law that curbed “opposition to government by legal
means and within constitutional limitations”).
159. Id.; see also Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
(discussing “the right to criticise” [sic] as essential to the “ultimate source of
authority”).
160. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
161. See Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369-70 (arguing that public opinion can stimulate
government to make changes, and that opportunity for free political discourse is a
fundamental element of our constitutional system).
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decision to uphold a state law that prohibited persons from
162
“discourag[ing] the enlistment of men in the military”:
The right of a citizen of the United States to take part, for his own
or the country’s benefit, in the making of federal laws and in the
conduct of the government, necessarily includes the right to speak
or write about them; to endeavor to make his own opinion
concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and, to this end,
163
to teach the truth as he sees it.

Expression calling into question government authority, therefore,
164
According to Meiklejohn,
“is the essence of self-government.”
whose theory of the First Amendment rests on the principle that in
America “[r]ulers and ruled are the same individuals,” the
Constitution protects opinions that are “unfair as well as fair,
dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well as American” on the
ground that all are necessary for informed decision making about the
165
public good.
The notion that the state must remain transparent to self-criticism
has resonance for a First Amendment theory of court access, because
preserving the right to bring legal actions attacking government
policy fulfills the representative feature of our system. Statutes that
are intended to frustrate, or have the effect of deterring, a citizen
from seeking redress for violations of higher law diminish the critic’s
role in public life and unjustifiably restrict a crucial category of
166
information upon which the courts and political branches rely. To
the extent that the state adopts such measures, it hinders citizens’
ability to communicate their opinions publicly as to the content of
fundamental values and the priorities that should be assigned to
these values by officials in power.
Litigants present concrete circumstances, highlight competing
norms, and advance new ways of understanding public values. The

162. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 326 (1920).
163. Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
164. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978); see also
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 96 (1960) [hereinafter POLITICAL
FREEDOM] (describing First Amendment as protecting “not merely ‘the freedom to
speak,’ but the ‘political freedom’ which the Constitution establishes as the basis for
any arrangement by which men govern themselves, rather than submit to despotic
control by others”).
165. See POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 26-27; see also California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking, Ltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510, 515 (1972) (finding that our
representative system rests on the ability of the citizenry to express their views to
their leaders); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 137 (1961) (same).
166. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
citizens’ opportunity to express their political opinions to the proper functioning of
democratic government).
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courts, in turn, give continuing meaning to constitutional principles
by resolving these disputes. To be sure, the federal courts are not
available to resolve every sort of grievance and are not constituted to
opine on values in the abstract. Only lawsuits presenting wellsupported allegations that protected rights have been abridged enjoy
a reasonable chance of success. However, by protecting equal and
meaningful access to the legal system, the judiciary ensures that
“conflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because
167
they are valid, but because they are relevant.”
C. Protecting Vulnerable Speech
A third tenet to be drawn from the Court’s rulings on antigovernment expression is that criticism of governmental affairs must
be safeguarded because dissent represents the type of expression over
which government has the most control and is most tempted to
168
suppress.
Bureaucratic explanations are at the forefront, for
extended debates about constitutional rights are inconvenient for
even the most well intentioned political leaders.
The individuals
whose rights may be affected might not vote regularly and thus might
not evoke a feeling of personal stake or public duty from their
representatives that would cause serious consideration of their
169
interests.

167. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 27. Theories of the First Amendment
rooted in concepts of political legitimacy are often criticized on the ground that they
fail either to descriptively account for the modern trend toward recognizing a right
of individual self-actualization for its own sake, or fail normatively to justify First
Amendment protection of artistic expression. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 21, at 708
(contending that the Meicklejohnian view “does not extend protection to literary,
scientific, and forms of speech that contribute to self-realization”); C. Edwin Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (arguing
that free speech allows individuals to self-actualize through expression). I believe it
possible to ground protection of artistic expression within a political framework by
understanding artistic expression as historically, and functionally, related to antigovernment speech. While it certainly is not the case that all artists try to affect
policy, it can hardly be doubted that art traditionally has had a strong political
component: it allows artists to express dissatisfaction with contemporary cultural
mores and political values, and helps viewers of art to cultivate the capacity to
imagine alternative ways of social and political organization. More to the point,
theories that emphasize the importance of self-realization as a First Amendment
value, to the exclusion of political accountability, do not provide a meaningful guide
to explain the importance of court access.
168. See First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 n.11 (“Freedom of expression has
particular significance with respect to government because ‘[i]t is here that the state
has special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of
suppression.”) (quoting EMERSON, supra note 29, at 9).
169. See POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 95 (discussing “ignorance and
apathy” among segments of society as a reason for the nation being only partially
“self-governed”).
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Furthermore, the idea of a faceless, neutral government is pure
fiction, as ordinary people who make decisions for the public good
possess the same human prejudices, irrational fears, and intenselyheld religious or moral convictions as the citizens in whose name they
purport to govern. Most of the time, such influences upon official
decision-making are natural and unobjectionable on constitutional
grounds. Occasionally, however, animus toward one group of citizens
or their perspectives forms the impulse behind a particular course of
conduct, and in those instances, the Constitution rejects these bases
170
for state action. Some observers have suggested a tendency on the
part of the state to crush dissent, on the view that power, with a life of
its own, naturally seeks to expand its influence and blinds those in
171
positions of authority to the possibility of alternative truths.
According to this perspective, access to courts must be protected
on the ground that constitutional rights likely will be sacrificed by
elected officials who take unjustifiable shortcuts to achieve their ends.
The First Amendment ensures the right of people who normally are
invisible within our polity, who have no lobbyists, or donors, or
consistent advocates (and even those who do), to criticize
government in the courts. It compels officials who currently set
policy, and the courts which are obliged to give meaning to more
enduring principles, to hear from citizens other than those
occupying the boisterous middle, whose short-term interests often
shape the contours of the law and the direction of government
affairs. When one seeks structural reform of existing law—whether in
the legislatures or the courts—leaders are forced to listen to
individuals at the margins of society who might be most impacted by
their day-to-day decisions.


170. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a law denying
individuals the ability to seek legal protection from government action because of
sexual orientation violated equal protection).
171. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“Persecution for the
expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your
premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally
express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
EMERSON, supra note 29, at 17 (“Most men have a strong inclination to suppress
opposition even where differences in viewpoint are comparatively slight.”); JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 63-65 (1929) (acknowledging “[t]he disposition of
mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and
inclinations as a rule of conduct on others”). But see Jeremy J. Ofseyer, Taking
Liberties With John Stuart Mill, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 395, 422-46 (1999) (arguing
that the Court has distorted Mill’s views to the extent it has suggested Mill tolerated
false speech).
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D. The Anti-Government Nature of Constitutional Litigation
1.

The civil rights plaintiff as political dissident
Although the analogy is not perfect, it may be helpful to
understand constitutional litigation as a peculiar variety of political
172
expression—namely, anti-government speech.
The nature of the
endeavor, the rules that govern the adjudicative process, and the
roles played by those involved in the battle over fundamental
principles bolster the plaintiff’s role as a political dissident. In this
Section, I identify the aspects of constitutional reform litigation that
reflect this theme.
173
Unlike ordinary litigation or “dispute resolution,” the act of suing
a branch of government or public official in court is an explicit, often
multi-faceted, challenge to the authority of the defendant174
government in the name of the public interest.
The initiation of
structural reform litigation, unlike ordinary suits between private
parties, is inherently radical in nature. As Professor Owen Fiss
explains, the entire enterprise “reflects doubt as to whether the status
175
quo is in fact just.” As religious dissidents might describe it, the civil
176
rights action is a “revolt against the establish[ment].”
In the truest sense of the word, a civil rights plaintiff who
undertakes this program of reform becomes a quintessential
dissident: “a person who disagrees with an opinion, resolution, or
177
proposal” or who “openly opposes the policies of a totalitarian
178
The heresy, which the individual commits when he
regime.”

172. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 24-25, 55, 90 (1983)
(discussing the history of free speech and the First Amendment in American society);
see generally POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 96 (discussing the role of free
speech in a democratic society).
173. See Fiss, Social and Political Foundations, supra note 2, at 124 (contrasting two
models of adjudication, “dispute resolution” and “structural reform,” the latter of
which emerged as a “new form of constitutional litigation”).
174. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (affirming the notion that
civil rights plaintiffs sue to vindicate interests “for society at large”); Chayes, supra
note 2, at 1284 (suggesting that the dominant feature of modern federal litigation is
its underlying objective to vindicate a constitutional or statutory policy, rather than
resolve a dispute between private parties about private rights, and characterizing
such litigation as “public law litigation”).
175. Fiss, Social and Political Foundations, supra note 2, at 124.
176. MECKLIN, supra note 31, at 13. In the American religious tradition, dissent
typically takes the form of a sect challenging the dominant faith. Id. In sociological
terms, the sect is defined by the rejection of all forms of dogma and religious
authority, and an emphasis on tolerance, the pursuit of a “sectarian ideal [that] is
usually radical and hence utopian in character,” and the turning inward, rather than
outward, to achieve their ideal. Id. at 18, 20-21, 31.
177. See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 702 (1993) (defining
“Dissenter”).
178. See id. (defining “Dissident”). The notion that a dissident opposes an
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publicly challenges the authority of the constituted entity, “is a set of
unpopular ideas or opinions on matters of grave concern to the
179
community.” The tradition of American dissent, whether rooted in
180
religious faith or secular principles, is a powerful one, and it is from
181
this mold that the modern litigant has emerged.
The actual filing of the complaint is a powerful publication of
dissent; by initiating the action, the plaintiff-dissident declares her
182
This act of protest, protected by the First
refusal to conform.
Amendment, commonly is understood as an overt display of
disagreement, usually in the form of marches, speeches, and rallies.
But the term also has a more formal connotation: to “give
(esp[ecially] formal) expression to objection, dissent, or disapproval”
183
or to “make a request in legal form,” and it is this more formalized
protest in which the plaintiff engages. Whether a lawsuit demands
monetary damages or equitable relief, every civil rights plaintiff seeks
a formal, enforceable declaration that certain government
enactments, policies, or practices exceed the government’s lawful
184
authority.
Another characteristic shared by these two models of dissent is the
lack of available alternatives to achieve desired goals. As the
sociology of revolt and even the First Amendment case law protecting
constitutional litigation reflect, those who turn to the courts often are
185
the vulnerable and dispossessed. For the inmate, welfare recipient,
or religious minority residing in a mostly homogeneous community,
186
the levers of power are nearly always beyond his reach.

establishment or institutional way of thinking, such as “a prevailing or established
form of religion,” is an essential element of the word. Id.
179. SIDNEY HOOK, HERESY, YES––CONSPIRACY, NO! 21 (1953).
180. See generally MECKLIN, supra note 31, at 82-263 (describing religious dissenters
in early American colonial history).
181. Cf. FORTAS, supra note 144, at 41-42 (discussing alternative means of
expressing disagreement with state policies, including exercising right of free
expression through speech, organization, and demonstration, and suing the state or
its officials directly).
182. See id. at 42 (describing legal action against government as a form of dissent).
183. See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2389 (1993) (defining
“Protest”).
184. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (overturning convictions
for disturbing the peace where defendants, who were black, peacefully sat at a lunch
counter reserved for whites); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding
that government-imposed segregation in public schools violated guarantees of equal
protection); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (declaring unconstitutional
trespass convictions of Jehovah’s Witnesses for proselytizing).
185. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 83, at 108 (describing early twentieth century
constitutional challenges to laws in southern states, which prohibited blacks from
participating in primary elections, and which effectively denied blacks representation
in the South).
186. See Fiss, Social and Political Foundations, supra note 2, at 122 (describing
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Constitutional litigation represents a particularly effective means of
187
communicating displeasure with government policy.
2.

Invoking core values
There certainly are real differences between the archetypal
dissident and the civil rights plaintiff. The former tends to be a
charismatic leader or other influential individual, who has suffered
prolonged persecution and articulates a program of action or well188
defined set of beliefs.
The latter is less likely to have a following,
might prefer to shield his identity from public scrutiny, and may or
may not adhere to a particular ideology. Nevertheless, the points of
overlap between the new and the old are striking.
Civil rights plaintiffs, like traditional political dissidents, call upon
public values and social interests at a level of generality that extends
well beyond the immediate policy debates that have given rise to the
189
challenged enactment or policy.
Just as the traditional dissenter
appeals to higher moral or religious authority to justify his act of
190
protest, so the modern contrariant seeks legitimacy in fundamental
191
principles of law and broader conceptions of the public good.
The important distinction between the traditional dissenter and
the civil rights litigant is that the former strategically submits to the
political-legal authority to make his point, accepting punishment to
192
emphasize the injustice of his situation,
while the latter

evolution of structural reform litigation as a means for certain social groups, such as
inmates, racial minorities, and disabled persons, to challenge unconstitutional
government action); FORTAS, supra note 144, at 33-34 (recognizing that many citizens
who comprise social or political minorities are “divorced from the conventional
instruments of power”).
187. See Fiss, Social and Political Foundations, supra note 2, at 122 (suggesting that
traditional forms of dispute resolution provide no remedy for certain social groups).
188. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM:
THE
MONTGOMERY STORY 25-43, 90-107 (1958) (describing repressive conditions in Jim
Crow South, King’s development of a philosophy of non-violent resistance, and
massive, non-violent protests he led); id. at 102-03, 217 (describing Gandhi’s role as a
non-violent leader and invoking his teachings as a model for black resistance to
oppression in American South).
189. See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1284 (describing “public law litigation” as a type
of lawsuit in which complaining party seeks liberation from a policy or act in
violation of Constitution or federal statutes).
190. See MECKLIN, supra note 31, at 18 (describing American religious dissenters’
practice of invoking Jesus’ teachings of radical equality rather than other aspects of
the Bible); FORTAS, supra note 144, at 53 (characterizing practitioners of civil
disobedience as being “motivated by the highest moral principles”).
191. See FORTAS, supra note 144, at 42, 48 (discussing moral and legal bases for
actions of civil disobedience and lawsuits against government).
192. See KING, supra note 188, at 146 (describing King’s willing submission to his
own arrest and imprisonment, and noting how many of his non-violent followers had
“rushed down to get arrested,” adding that, among the non-violent protestors, “[n]o
one . . . tried to evade arrest”); FORTAS, supra note 144, at 57-58 (characterizing
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purposefully employs the legal process as a creative means to effect a
193
But make no mistake—the
transformation in government policy.
plaintiff-dissident’s actions are no less radical or communicative, they
are simply more effective. Where the dissident of old focused his
actions upon drawing attention to a particular issue, while ultimately
194
relying on others to rally to his cause,
the mechanism of
constructive change is more firmly within the modern dissenter’s
195
grasp. The goals, however, remain analogous at bottom: recasting
196
government to be more in accord with enduring values.
3.

Legitimacy through ordeal
Another characteristic shared by the civil disobedient and the
plaintiff-dissident is that both derive their legitimacy from
persecution. Each understands that his probability of success in
reforming the political-legal order depends greatly upon his ability to
persuade others to take action. It takes more than interesting ideas
to move people; would-be sympathizers must be convinced that the
individual has moral conviction and a chance of success. He seeks
influence with two audiences simultaneously through his expressive
conduct: repeat players within the electoral process who enjoy access
to political authority, and the community of people who share his
concerns, which may lack such access.
The dissident’s source of legitimacy is visible suffering at the hands
197
of the authorities. The suffering takes two distinct forms: systemic
198
state persecution, as to which the dissident is powerless; and
suffering as a stature-building tool, over which the dissident has far
199
greater control. In the first sense, persecution offers the dissident

Martin Luther King’s acceptance of his prison sentence as an example of traditional
civil disobedience, in which the dissenter willfully accepts the legal consequences of
his actions).
193. See FORTAS, supra note 144, at 42 (discussing the availability of suit against the
government as a means of dissent).
194. See KING, supra note 188, at 71-89 (elaborating on organizational costs
involved in carrying out effective protests).
195. See FORTAS, supra note 144, at 42 (noting that individual dissidents may effect
change in an immediate way by bringing a lawsuit directly against government).
196. Compare KING, supra note 188, at 62 (invoking “highest principles of law and
order” as objective of King’s non-violent protests), with FORTAS, supra note 144, at 42
(suggesting that individuals may sue government when they believe that state has
interfered with their constitutional rights).
197. See FORTAS, supra note 144, at 57-58 (discussing Martin Luther King’s
submission to law he disregarded as unjust); KING, supra note 188, at 177-78 (urging
non-violent protesters to wear down their opposition through their capacity to
withstand suffering).
198. See generally KING, supra note 188, at 25-43 (discussing repressive
consequences of state imposed segregation policies).
199. See id. at 217 (urging African Americans to adopt Gandhi’s principles of non-
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the opportunity to represent a community of shared interests, and
200
speak on behalf of those similarly victimized by the state’s conduct.
In the second, instrumentalist, step, persecution becomes
appropriated from the state and transformed by the dissident; it
201
becomes a tool for accomplishing his ends.
For the charismatic leader, the ordeal can take the form of
incarceration, a propaganda campaign aimed at his broader
movement or its goals, or surviving physical abuse by the authorities;
undergoing the ordeal provides proof of moral stature and mental
202
resolve. Persecution invigorates, rather than defeats, the critic, and
he turns it to his advantage.
Like the civil disobedient, the plaintiff-dissident often represents a
203
community of shared interests. For the plaintiff-dissident, the legal
process presents features of the ordeal over which he has less control,
but also offers opportunities to use suffering to accomplish his
objectives. It is not sufficient for the litigant to assert the violation of
some constitutional right; to prevail, he must, in the course of a
public proceeding, demonstrate the extent of the injustice wrought
204
by state action. The more substantial the actual injury or likelihood
of harm, the more likely the judge will rule in his favor and constrain
the behavior of the state or order the reformation of the state
205
entity. In this way, suffering may serve as an instrument by which a

violence and to use suffering as a means to win freedom from the repression of
American segregation policies).
200. See generally id. at 62, 214-15 (speaking as an advocate for, and on behalf of,
African Americans oppressed by repressive actions of segregationist states).
201. See id. at 217 (characterizing suffering as a strategy to overcome oppression).
202. See generally id. (recounting King’s life-long efforts to overcome segregation
and achieve racial and social equality, and non-violent movement that he initiated).
203. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among
Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1644-61
(1997) (providing an illuminating discussion on duties of a civil rights plaintiff to
broader community in whose name he seeks structural reform).
204. See FORTAS, supra note 144, at 42-43 (explaining that “the citizen and the state
are on terms of equality to advocate their contentions before an impartial court,”
and noting that while citizen may claim a violation of a constitutional right, state may
assert that he acted beyond constitutional protections).
205. See, e.g., Katz v. Georgetown Univ., 246 F.3d 685, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(explaining that to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the action, that he would suffer
irreparable injury in the absence of the injunction, that the balance of hardships
weighs against the plaintiff, and that the public interest would be served by the
injunction). The first prong of the inquiry is easily satisfied by the alleged
abridgement of one’s constitutionally guaranteed rights. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot. v. OSHA, 138 F. Supp. 2d 285, 291 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that an
alleged violation of a constitutional right triggers a finding of irreparable injury)
(citing Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996)). The second and third
prongs typically present the more difficult hurdles. See Katz, 246 F.3d at 688 (noting
that in spite of the relevance of all four factors, a preliminary injunction “never will
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206

plaintiff-dissident can unlock the judicial power. The litigant must
endure probing, sometimes hostile, cross-examination by government
attorneys delving deeply into private matters of sexual practice or
religious faith when the right to privacy is in issue; where free speech
rights are at stake, he may be asked to explain the unexplainable in
describing what intimate thoughts motivated him to draw, write, or
otherwise express certain profane ideas.
Both types of dissenters frequently face the prospect of official
retaliation for their anti-establishment views. The charismatic leader
understands that engaging in civil disobedience, demonstrating in
public, and decrying social ills will earn her greater scrutiny by the
207
state—indeed, it may place her directly in harm’s way.
The civil
rights plaintiff, too, must grapple with the possibility of official
reprisal. The inmate who files a grievance against a correctional
officer reasonably fears that her privileges may be cut off or that he
208
may sustain physical abuse; the government employee fears that she
may be denied a promotion or suffer other types of adverse
employment action because she has asserted her legal rights against
209
the state.
The fact that an entirely separate body of law has
developed to protect those who criticize the government
demonstrates the profoundly subversive nature of asserting one’s
210
rights.

be granted unless a claimant can demonstrate ‘a fair ground for litigation’”). The
novelty of an argument may weigh against a plaintiff in this calculus, whereas the
egregiousness of the alleged facts may strengthen one’s entitlement to temporary
relief. While there is rarely a clear delineation between the third and fourth prongs,
courts almost always balance the intrusiveness of the relief requested against the
harm faced by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Hoylake Invs., Ltd. v. Washburn, 723 F. Supp.
42, 49 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
206. See, e.g., Katz, 246 F.3d at 687 (requiring a plaintiff to show, inter alia, that he
has suffered “irreparable harm” before injunction may issue).
207. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 22 (1992)
(describing violent attacks on civil rights protesters and widespread incidence of
their arrests); GREENBERG, supra note 83, at 272-73 (recounting violence, both official
and private, faced by civil rights leaders and protesters).
208. See David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The “Iron Triangle” of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1691 (2001) (suggesting that
fear of retaliation by correctional officials often discourages aggrieved inmates from
bringing suit).
209. See generally Margo Pave, Comment, Public Employees and the First Amendment
Petition Clause: Protecting the Rights of Citizen-Employees Who File Legitimate Grievances and
Lawsuits Against Their Government Employers, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 304 (1995) (discussing
consequences and solutions to the problem of retaliation against government
employees who sue their government employers).
210. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding that a public
school teacher’s dismissal due to her outspoken criticism of board of education
policy contravened free speech guarantee).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=429380

TSAI.PRINTER.DOC

876

7/26/2002 12:33 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 835

4.

Government as authoritarian
The norms-challenging nature of public law litigation is
underscored when one considers the role of the defendantgovernment as the principal obstacle to progress. According to the
strongest variant of this perspective, which draws deeply from the
American liberal political tradition, “government is . . . some hostile
force, or at least some necessary evil, which constantly threatens to
211
prey on its subjects.”
An alternative account—one that is less
hostile to the idea of government—recognizes government’s inherent
capacity to stifle difference and change, but acknowledges the need
for countervailing structures that have the power to check the
passions of those who might employ the state’s coercive authority as a
212
tool of oppression. Public officials might not actually be motivated
by a desire to tyrannize—they may in fact have laudable goals in mind
and a benevolent disposition—but as state agents they possess the
capacity to abridge one’s rights. On this view, it is the regulatory state
213
In checking the
that presents the greatest threat to liberty.
authority of elected officials, courts “make sure that [their] attempts
214
to make men free do not result in making them slaves.”
The manner in which the state responds to opposition, particularly
aggressive dissent, reveals the anti-establishment quality of the speech
at issue. When the government resorts to repressive measures against
the protester, it acts in an authoritarian manner and reveals a
dissonance between governing ideals and reality.
The same point is illustrated by the public stance frequently taken
by government in the course of constitutional litigation. Until the
point that a plaintiff-dissident actually prevails the governmentdefendant often treats the lawsuit as groundless and the complainant
as an irritant at best, and a disloyal citizen at worst. This point is

211. WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE & THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 67, 148-60 (1969).
212. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[C]ourts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison):
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
See generally BURNS, supra note 172, at 60-63 (1982) (discussing Framers’ efforts to
create a government that could thwart various forms of tyranny, including tyranny of
opinion).
213. See EMERSON, supra note 29, at 38 (arguing that “[t]he government has
become an overpowering antagonist in any clash between state and individual”).
214. FREE SPEECH, supra note 29, at 13; see also EMERSON, supra note 29, at 35-46.
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emphasized by the fact that, in some cases, the government has
sought to discredit the complainant or whip up community sentiment
215
In recognition of such possibilities, individuals are
against him.
sometimes allowed to employ pseudonyms to protect themselves from
216
undue threat of harm. There are few accolades for the individualdissident who questions authority in the courts.
But even where the individual prevails, he would be foolish to
believe that a structural solution represents the end of the road.
Defeated government-defendants are not always cowed by judicial
authority, even when forced to submit to it. Additional skirmishes
over the actual enforcement of the decree may serve as the occasion
for an emboldened government to try new methods of achieving the
217
same goals.
5.

Litigation as confrontational expression
There are also more than passing similarities between the plaintiffdissident and the dissenter of old in their method of expression. As
experts have long understood, those engaged in civil disobedience
218
employ confrontation as a strategy of communication. The rhetoric
of confrontation serves as the “mechanism through which adjustment

215. Cf. Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants Be
Permitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2, 20 (1985) (noting
that plaintiffs use pseudonyms to protect privacy, prevent stigma or retaliation, or
challenge governmental activity).
216. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing right to terminate a
pregnancy); Doe v. Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (declaring
unconstitutional student-initiated prayer at school-sponsored event); Doe v. Pataki, 3
F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing right of convicted sex offender to due
process with regard to public registry). When an individual challenges government
conduct, that fact weighs in favor of protecting a plaintiff-dissident’s anonymity. See
S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713
(5th Cir. 1979) (listing, among those circumstances in which courts have allowed
plaintiffs to use fictitious names, cases involving violation of state laws, challenge to
government regulation, or desire to engage in illegal conduct).
217. Even where rights have been violated and the court has fixed a remedy, there
has been an increased willingness on the part of the judiciary to abide “defiance” of
court orders. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 768 (1992) (arguing that “the Court’s doctrine is
evolving in a fashion that permits some controlled defiance of judicial orders” to
enforce the Constitution). For a fascinating case study of the limits of judicial
authority to enforce constitutional norms in the face of state court resistance, see Del
Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v.
Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994).
218. See generally Harry A. Bailey, Jr., Confrontation As An Extension of Communication,
in DISSENT: SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR AND RHETORICAL STRATEGIES 181 (Haig A. Bosmajian
ed., 1972) [hereinafter DISSENT] (discussing confrontation as a form of
communication); Robert L. Scott & Donald K. Smith, The Rhetoric of Confrontation,
Quarterly J. of Speech 1-8 (1969), in DISSENT, supra note 218, at 170 (discussing
confrontation as a rhetorical device).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=429380

TSAI.PRINTER.DOC

878

7/26/2002 12:33 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 835

219

to new conditions can be brought about.” By participating in sit-ins
and demonstrations, the dissident and his supporters attempt to
provoke a heterogeneous society to dismantle official injustice; be it
the institution of slavery, the system of segregation, or the repression
220
of progressive intellectuals.
Confrontation remains the strategy for the civil rights litigant, but
takes new form: systematized conflict. The plaintiff-dissident forces
the government to justify its actions by doggedly pursuing his claims
of constitutional wrongdoing; the state denies that it has violated
anyone’s rights; the court eventually delineates the parameters of
official authority by either upholding the government’s conduct or
reproaching it. Like the petition of an earlier era, the modern
lawsuit vindicating an individual’s constitutional rights “force[s] the
government’s attention on the claims of the governed when no other
221
mechanism could.”
Every step of the way, the government must
222
respond or risk default.
Within the litigation-centered model of conflict, the federal courts
displace the media as the main facilitator of information to the
223
public.
To many members of the media and ordinary observers,
the legal process is opaque; the language of the law, foreign. As a
result, they must rely heavily on the participants in the process to
translate and transmit the values that are involved, and explicate the
real life consequences of court rulings for bystanders whose rights
224
may be affected by the controversy.
In overseeing a high-profile conflict over constitutional principles
and policy priorities within the confines of narrow issues and relevant
circumstances, and by providing a specialized forum for the focused
expression of minority viewpoints, the legal system educates the

219. LEWIS A. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 128 (1956), quoted in
Harry Bailey, Confrontation as an Extension of Communication, in DISSENT, supra note
218, at 192-93.
220. See, e.g., FORTAS, supra note 144, at 51 (describing civil disobedients’ strategy
to “publicize a protest and to bring pressure on the public or the government”); id.
at 63 (noting that “protests awakened the nation’s conscience to an intolerable
situation . . . of fundamental rights and equal opportunity”); see generally GREENBERG,
supra note 83, at 268-73 (describing spread of sit-ins and demonstrations during civil
rights era).
221. Mark, supra note 53, at 2157.
222. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (authorizing default judgment when “a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (providing that failure to present evidence
raising issues of fact may result in summary judgment).
223. See GRAHAM, supra note 207, at 20 (discussing how Brown v. Board of Education
transformed public responses to legal segregation and unofficial intimidation).
224. See Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers For Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 252-54 (1976) (discussing public interest litigation as a
pedagogical tool).
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parties about the enduring values that shape and bind our
225
community and give them contemporary meaning. The process, in
turn, can provoke broader discourse about the moral controversies of
the day.
6.

The rules of engagement
Unlike the confrontation tactics of the streets, legal conflict is far
more formal, more ritualized, and more focused. As distinguished
from the unpredictable, free-wheeling vehicle of mass mobilization,
the clash over constitutional rights is channeled through a preexisting process regulated by a complicated web of procedures and
standards accepted by both sides, though there may be hard-fought
disputes over the application of these rules. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules of evidence, and local court rules require
litigants to identify legal issues and sources of proof, and to abide by
standards of ethical conduct. Failure to plead legal claims properly
or support them at crucial stages of the proceedings will result in an
adverse final judgment and an early end to the plaintiff-dissident’s
226
project; violation of disclosure demands or ethical rules could result
in sanctions or the deprivation of evidence necessary to make one’s
227
case.
At each step of the process, as issues are refined or cast aside, the
participant accepts new duties, but also expects that the process will
be handled impartially and that a remedy ultimately will be available
if she prevails. No similar set of obligations and expectations flows
from the highly unpredictable strategy of the street, which can be
228
incredibly successful or disastrous.
The rules governing this kind of communicative endeavor confirm
the complainant’s place as political dissident.
Although the
individual resorts to the courts in part because the new forum

225. See POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 164, at 32 (arguing that the “Supreme
Court has a large part to play in our national teaching . . . because it interprets
principles of fact and of value, not merely from the abstract, but also in their bearing
upon concrete, immediate problems which are, at any given moment, puzzling and
dividing us”); Fiss, The Forms of Justice, supra note 2, at 1 (arguing that “[t]he function
of the judge is to give concrete meaning and application to our constitutional
values”).
226. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (stating requirements for initial motions and
pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating requirements for motions and proceedings
for summary judgment).
227. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (setting forth sanctionable misconduct associated
with pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4) (empowering courts to impose sanctions for
violations of discovery rules).
228. See, e.g., FORTAS, supra note 144, at 67 (warning that violence can flow from
mass demonstrations and civil disobedience could “lead to repression”).
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reduces some inequalities in prestige and resources, the rules do not
229
By placing the
universally place the parties on equal footing.
burden of overturning a law on constitutional grounds squarely upon
the challenger, the principles of constitutional adjudication
230
emphasize her isolation and the subversive character of her speech.
Official enactments are presumptively valid, and unless a
challenged law is conclusively demonstrated to contravene a
protected right, the legal system will not and should not make it easy
231
for the nonconformist to prevail on the merits.
Within First
Amendment doctrine, for instance, courts adhere to the maxim that
a regulation affecting speech will not be struck down as overbroad
unless it sweeps within its ambit a “substantial amount of speech” that
232
is constitutionally protected.
This doctrine is justified on the
ground that overturning a law on its face is a measure of “last
233
resort.”
Likewise, a court will not strike down a statute because a
law is confusing or poorly written; the void for vagueness doctrine
demands only that a hypothetical person of ordinary intelligence can
understand its terms, and makes no allowances for subjective frailties
234
or other individual conditions that might affect intelligibility.
In other respects, substantive causes of action have been
interpreted to make the plaintiff-dissident’s project more difficult.
For example, the Court has sharply limited an individual’s ability to
prove invidious racial discrimination that violates the Equal
235
Protection Clause through the use of statistical evidence.
Furthermore, the Court has expanded prison officials’ discretion to
enact regulations so long as they are reasonably related to “legitimate

229. But see id. at 43 (asserting that “the citizen and the state are on terms of
equality to advocate their contentions”).
230. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
(“We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid.”).
231. See id. at 944 (acknowledging that a court should not judge wisdom of a
statute and will only overturn a statute if it plainly violates Constitution).
232. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992)
(explaining that overbreadth doctrine liberalized standing rules in First Amendment
context by allowing an individual to call for nullification of a law even if he would not
otherwise have standing to attack it in all of its applications). This expansion
stemmed from the recognition that overbroad laws may chill the exercise of free
speech. Id.
233. Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39
(1999) (emphasizing that overbreadth doctrine should be used sparingly because it
is considered “strong medicine”).
234. See Turner v. South-Western City Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (1999).
235. See McCleksey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that a study showing
differential application of death penalty based on race was insufficient); United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that a study used to make a
selective prosecution claim failed, in part, because it did not show differential
treatment among similarly situated people).
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236

penological interests,” and, in the area of the death penalty, largely
reduced the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishment” to a mechanical tallying up of how many states persist in
employing a particular method of administering the sanction in
237
question. I do not mean to suggest that these particular rulings are
inconsistent with a First Amendment right of access but only wish to
point to these examples as illustrations of how substantive decisions
can emphasize the speaker’s role as dissident.
Paradoxically, many of the procedural rules have been relaxed in
the last thirty years so as to facilitate the assertion of constitutional
238
claims.
Perhaps this is recognition of the importance of
Constitution-based dissent and the practical difficulties in successfully
advancing one’s reform agenda. It is easier today to get in the
courthouse door under modern pleading and standing
239
240
requirements, particularly if one is indigent, and harder to be
thrust rudely into the cold on mootness grounds once circumstances
241
have changed.

236. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (reinforcing that a “lesser
standard” is more appropriate when assessing whether a prison regulation infringes
inmates’ constitutional rights).
237. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (ruling that
execution of an individual who was 16 or 17 years old when he committed a capital
offense did not violate “evolving standards of decency” because majority of death
penalty states permit such executions).
238. See Fiss, Social and Political Foundations, supra note 2, at 122 (referring to Brown
v. Board of Education opinion as a catalyst for structural reform movement).
239. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Assoc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (holding that
standing and mootness doctrines are most favorable to plaintiffs when First
Amendment rights are at stake); see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 2.5, at 131 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter FEDERAL JURISDICTION]
(claiming that a case is not moot so long as plaintiff continues to suffer injury). But
see Lyons v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (contradicting trend toward
easing standing rules for individuals pursuing constitutional claims by denying
department-wide injunctive relief for illegal choke holds committed by police officers
because it was speculative that plaintiff would suffer same injury in future).
240. See Hughes v. Rome, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (reiterating that pro se pleadings are
to be read by courts under a more lenient standard); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971) (holding that court fees and costs must be waived if one is indigent).
Accord Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (restating leniency standard).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) singles out only certain claims for particular
specificity, namely fraud or mistake. See generally FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note
239, at 489-90 (criticizing heightened pleading requirements for civil rights lawsuits
because “[e]xclusion of many meritorious claims seems inescapable if plaintiffs must
present facts supporting the existence of a municipal policy even before they engage
in discovery”).
241. When circumstances have changed, one may continue to litigate a claim if he
continues to have “concrete interest in the action,” or the matter comes within the
“capable of repetition yet evading review” exception. See Nebraska Press Assoc. v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (indicating that a well-pleaded claim for damages will
defeat mootness); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of
Health & Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835, 1842 (2001) (stating that as long as a plaintiff
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There have been recent signs of a conservative reaction in many
critical areas of civil rights litigation, such as the Eleventh
242
243
Amendment and qualified immunity. Courts have begun to erect
244
greater obstacles in the path of the plaintiff-dissident. Whether the
confluence of these burdens and rules work ultimately to the net
benefit of the individual or against him is an open question. The
point here, however, is that descriptively they reinforce the
complainant’s position as the nonconformist when she attacks
existing law.
7.

The reconstructive endeavor
Success for the modern dissident means forcing government to do
what it has strongly resisted doing. Where institutional resistance is
the problem, reformative power of the courts offers the solution.
Injunctive relief, when granted by a judicial body, is a reconstructive
and disruptive force, but in its more innocuous forms, the equitable
power can be utilized to compel an entity or official, under threat of
contempt of court, to cease and desist from enforcing
245
unconstitutional policies. This form of injunction is equivalent to a
coerced repeal of the offending law or policy. The level of
intrusiveness of this remedy, measured in terms of the degree and
duration of control exercised over a coordinate or subordinate
246
branch of government, is very low. To comply with both the letter
and spirit of the court order, the state need only refrain from
implementing the enjoined enactment or exempt the complainant
247
from the rules that normally apply to other citizens.

has a valid cause of action, a change in defendant’s conduct will not render case
moot).
242. See FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 239, at 403 (emphasizing that Supreme
Court consistently has held that Eleventh Amendment bars citizens from suing states
for damages).
243. See id. at 389-90, 493-500 (noting that qualified immunity provides an
affirmative defense for those acting on behalf of the state).
244. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts
for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 341, 359-81 (1990) (discussing
disproportionate use of Rule 11 sanctions against civil rights plaintiffs and a recent
tendency by federal courts to disfavor civil rights cases).
245. See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1292-93 (“Officials will almost inevitably act in
accordance with the judicial interpretation in the countless similar situations cast up
by a sprawling bureaucratic program.”).
246. See id. (elaborating that equitable remedy requires a “balancing of the
interests of the parties”).
247. This happens when, for example, a court upholds a law as valid but forbids its
application to the conduct of the individual before it. See, e.g., Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (“[A] statute or a rule may be held
constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a
protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate
exercise of state power is beyond question.”).
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Where the constitutional violation infects the government as a
whole, more affirmative solutions may be required. Under that
scenario, the court’s entire authority may be used to require the
expenditure of significant public funds, the hiring of new staff, or a
complete overhaul in the way a governmental agency performs its
essential functions. The court may impose strict timetables for
carrying out these tasks and appoint a special master to assist the
court in creating, implementing, and managing an effective
248
institutional solution.
Losing a complex civil rights case may very
well expose the government to the embarrassing prospect of direct,
249
extensive, and prolonged supervision by the judiciary.
Commentators have described the crisis of legitimacy that can arise
when courts impose structural reform to remedy constitutional
250
transgressions. Equitable relief taking the form of structural reform
does not represent a return of the parties to the status quo ante, but
251
“represents an attempt to construct a new social reality.”
The
remedy “m,ay have to last as long as the social reality it attempts to
252
create.” On the occasions where sustained, structural remedies are
warranted, ironically, the dissident and government swap roles. The
state now complains that its sphere of power has been abridged, and
invokes higher principles of constitutional law (i.e., federalism,
separation of powers) against the plaintiff, whom the state argues has
become the oppressor by usurping political authority with the
assistance of the courts.


248. See id. (citing examples of school desegregation, employment discrimination,
and prisoner rights as classes of cases that may involve structural reform); see also Fiss,
Social and Political Foundations, supra note 2, at 126 (discussing judge’s supervisory
role over institutional changes in civil rights cases).
249. See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1298 (explaining that civil rights injunction
“provides for a complex, on-going regime of performance rather than a simple, oneshot, one-way transfer . . . it prolongs and deepens, rather than terminates, the
court’s involvement with the dispute”).
250. See Fiss, The Forms of Justice, supra note 2, at 46-58. For additional criticism of
the role of the court in overseeing structural reform, see William A. Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635
(1982) (arguing that many public law remedies are problematic from a standpoint of
institutional legitimacy); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) (urging use of separation of powers
doctrine to limit scope of structural remedies).
251. See Fiss, Social and Political Foundations, supra note 2, at 121.
252. See id. at 124 (distinguishing between “dispute resolution” model of
adjudication and “structural reform” model).
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IV. ENFORCING A SPEECH-BASED RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. Interlude: Defining the Parameters of Access
As we move from our discussion of constitutional litigation and its
theoretical underpinnings, let us tackle the doctrinal implications of
a speech-bound ideal of court access.
Although there may be no right to actually receive any particular
remedy unless it is the only feasible way to address a constitutional
253
violation, or even to demand that a suit is resolved on the merits,
several general principles should frame our understanding of the
right of access. The right to engage in constitutional litigation
effectively is evidenced in the First Amendment’s Petition Clause,
which was “inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that
gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble,” and thus
should be construed as generously as these other freedoms, from
254
which it is “inseparable.”
As to suits to establish constitutional wrongdoing by government,
which represents “the core of the First Amendment’s protective
255
ambit,”
the right to seek redress is meaningful only if it
encompasses more than simply the ability to file a complaint. Rather,
it logically includes the right to articulate one’s claim intelligently.
The right to engage in this form of contrariaous speech extends to
the “collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
256
courts,” as well as the individual right to dissent by pursuing wellfounded appeals to constitutional limits on governmental authority.
This principle should apply to all stages of the proceedings,
protecting not only the legal theories and arguments advanced in
court, but also the actions taken to bring client and attorney together
to prepare for the case and to publicize their activities. The
Constitution’s free speech guarantees consistently have been
construed to encompass one’s ability to engage in speech
257
“effectively.”

253. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273 (3d ed. 2000).
254. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (recognizing venerable right to
petition).
255. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 (1978) (adding that any regulation designed
to limit these rights must do so with “narrow specificity”).
256. See United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)
(acknowledging group legal action as a fundamental right).
257. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988) (“The First Amendment
protects [the] appellee’s right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what
they believe to be the most effective means for doing so”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 101 (1940) (holding that state may not impair effective exercise of right to
free speech); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802-03 (1989)
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Professor Laurence Tribe makes a similar point when he notes that
the Free Speech Clauses impose additional “external” constraints on
the lawmaking branches’ power to regulate, directly or indirectly,
258
federal courts’ jurisdiction or the process of adjudication. The First
Amendment would impose limits on laws that
restrict access to the federal courts on the basis of a litigant’s race,
religion, gender or political affiliation or viewpoint. Moreover,
laws designed to hinder the exercise of constitutional rights are, to
that degree, unconstitutional. Likewise, even those jurisdictional
statutes which unintentionally burden the exercise of such rights
259
warrant strict scrutiny.

The underlying point, however, is the same: the Constitution
guarantees by implication, a “meaningful” opportunity to contest
260
government policy and relief where it is warranted.
Even those who emphatically deny that Congress or the Executive
must reply to petitions agree that federal courts are under a special
duty to address the lawsuits presented. Professors Lawson and
Seidman argue in favor of a more context-dependent approach to
261
While they see a “clear
understanding this duty to respond.
obligation to consider and respond to petitions” on the part of
federal courts, they find no constitutional duty on the part of
262
Congress or the Executive to respond to citizen grievances.
This
debate, however, obscures more central questions as to what
constitutes meaningful access. In all events, the First Amendment
should reach any rule or enactment having the effect of burdening or
discouraging one’s ability to pursue constitutional claims, or which
presents the danger of “distorting” the process by which
263
constitutional rights are adjudicated.

(holding that even content-neutral restriction on speech must leave channels of
“effective communication”).
258. See TRIBE, supra note 253, at 270-86 (distinguishing “external” constraints on
lawmaking branches from “internal” constraints imposed by Article III).
259. Id. at 273. This principle would extend in theory to rules that govern how
constitutional claims are presented to the court, even though Congress has broad
authority “to make rules governing the practice and pleading in [federal courts].”
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965).
260. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512
(1972) (declaring that First Amendment guarantees “meaningful access to the
agencies and courts”).
261. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 36, at 740 (asserting that an examination
of history and inferences drawn from the structure and text of the Constitution
demonstrate that the right to petition does not oblige Congress to consider all
petitions submitted).
262. See id. at 758 (arguing that “the First Amendment right to petition restates
and emphasizes the federal courts’ obligations to consider filings—petitions brought
to their attention—and to respond in some fashion to those filings”).
263. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001). See United States v.
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Consistent with the strong protections afforded criticism directed
explicitly at the state, “[b]road, prophylactic rules in the area of free
264
What is more, any interest advanced by the
speech are suspect.”
state in support of its restriction must be well supported by the facts,
265
not based on conjecture. Finally, the means by which government
addresses its concerns must be closely tailored to meet the problem
and burden no more speech than is absolutely necessary. Because
the right to challenge existing law lies at the heart of the First
Amendment, “government may regulate in the area only with narrow
266
specificity.”
Additionally, irrespective of whether there is a close fit between
goals and methods, any official action taken with the actual intent to
suppress or discourage the pursuit of colorable claims because the
authorities are hostile to the individual’s message would violate an
267
independent principle: the ban on viewpoint discrimination.
In
other words, if the rule or law is created to deter the exercise of one’s
constitutional rights or because the state disagrees with the litigant’s
point of view, the law must be stricken under the principle of speech
268
neutrality. As the Velazquez decision suggests, the rule against taking
sides in matters of opinion might very well be transgressed when
government restricts a plaintiff-dissident’s capacity to articulate, or
the courts’ ability to intelligently consider, constitutional claims.
1.

Possible objections
A skeptic might object to this conception of a right of court access
for fear that constitutional issues would be presented every time a
new law or rule governing the legal process was enacted. These fears,
however, are overstated. Where procedural rules are challenged, a
court must begin with the well-established principle that each distinct
mode of speech must be evaluated on its own terms. Here,
constitutional litigation plainly contemplates the existence of rules
that govern the manner in which that dissent is expressed. The mere

Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (holding that Congress penalize assertion of a
constitutional right); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969)
(declaring that residency requirement burdened right to travel).
264. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978).
265. Id. at 434 n.27.
266. Id. at 424 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)); see also Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may, however,
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest.”).
267. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
268. See Velazquez, 31 U.S. at 544-46; see supra Part II.B.
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existence of procedural and evidentiary rules, therefore, would not
violate the principle of meaningful access.
Not every law having an impact on litigation implicates free speech,
associational, or petition concerns.
The vast majority of the
procedural rules that courts use to manage cases should not implicate
First Amendment concerns if they are neutral rules of general
applicability and are genuinely designed not to suppress speech but
to facilitate the orderly and fair consideration of legal claims.
A mainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence, the “time, place or
269
manner” doctrine, is most helpful here.
Content-neutral rules
intended to facilitate where and how speech takes place, rather than
suppress expression, trigger more lenient review so long as the
procedures in question advance a significant governmental interest,
burden expression only incidentally, and leave ample alternative
270
channels of expression. The vast majority of procedural rules pass
271
this test.
Such procedural rules are intended to ensure the orderly and
efficient resolution of facts and legal issues rather than suppress
speech outright; the effect of the rules in most instances leaves the
plaintiff-dissident free to articulate her legal theories and claims.
With a few exceptions, the mechanics of civil procedure apply
regardless of the claims involved.
Even under the strict scrutiny test, rules that provide for special
treatment of certain kinds of claims, such as bankruptcy cases or
allegations of fraud, would pass muster if the particular claims
present special problems of complexity, the manner in which the rule
addresses such concerns is closely related to the identified concerns,
and the rules do not abridge one’s ability to articulate constitutional

269. See Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(observing that time, place and manner regulations may be necessary to further
significant governmental interest); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
115 (1972) (asserting that a forum’s nature and normal pattern of activities therein
dictate whether time, place and manner regulation is reasonable).
270. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (outlining
general framework for sustaining a content neutral regulation).
271. One interesting situation in which a speech-centered right of access has
particular relevance concerns content-based rules as to the content of pleadings. In
Anastasoff v. United States, the Eighth Circuit held that a court rule declaring that
unpublished opinions are not precedent and should not be cited in pleadings was
unconstitutional because it granted federal courts judicial power beyond the limits of
Article III. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d
1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000). One might think that Article III would be a source of
authority for federal courts to govern themselves rather than a limitation on courts’
ability to do so. A better basis for striking down the rule is that barring litigants from
citing precedent or penalizing them for doing so interferes with plaintiffs’ abilities to
articulate their legal theories and fairly present their claims, and therefore violates
the First Amendment right of court access.
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claims or impose unjustified conditions on relief. Where rules are
carved out for classes of litigants (e.g., prisoners) and those rules have
a reasonably likely effect on the ability of that class of individuals to
articulate constitutional claims (or were enacted because of hostility
to that group’s views), the First Amendment would come strongly
into play.
Accepting the notion that free speech principles limit the
government’s authority to impair the assertion of constitutional
claims does not mean that the flexibility of the Speech and Petition
Clauses need be abandoned. The First Amendment should retain its
resilient capacity to measure the effect of any rule affecting speech in
kind and degree, and permit courts to consider laws in light of the
272
unique circumstances that shape each distinct mode of expression.
2.

Due process v. first amendment
It is best to think of a First Amendment right of court access as
complementing the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause,
rather than displacing it. While both provisions safeguard access to
judicial relief, the Court’s due process rulings recognize a right of
access in more limited situations: when a fundamental right is at
stake and a “judicial proceeding . . . [is] the only effective means of
273
While Boddie and its progeny
resolving the dispute at hand.”
explicitly require these conditions to be met before due process
274
would apply, fundamental values and exclusivity of remedy do not
comprise necessary conditions for First Amendment protection.
Instead, under a speech-centered theory of access, the critical
question might be whether a rule unduly burdens one’s right to
engage in constitutional litigation.
There are obvious temporal differences as well. Whereas the Boddie
line of cases focuses exclusively on initial access to the legal system,
the First Amendment reaches expressive conduct related to dissident

272. The Supreme Court has recognized, for example, that each medium of
expression possesses its own unique features and that free speech analysis must take
account of these circumstances. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (asserting that different mediums present their own
problems for First Amendment analysis); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746
(1978) (noting that offensive language is accorded different constitutional
protection depending on its context).
273. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443-46 (1973) (explaining and limiting
applicability of Boddie).
274. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971) (involving access fees
for divorce); Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-50 (distinguishing Boddie and holding that
elimination of debt burden does not implicate constitutional issues requiring a
judicial hearing).
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275

These
activity both within and without the political-legal order.
decisions also pave the way toward a right of meaningful adjudication
once proceedings are under way; instead of securing the opportunity
simply to be heard, as is true with due process principles, the free
speech approach ensures the dissenter’s ability to convey important
and useful information to the courts.
Moreover, there is a difference in who is protected: the attorney
has an independent expressive interest under the First Amendment;
the right of due process, on the other hand, usually attaches to the
276
client alone.
In short, a speech-centered right of access is more
flexible than the traditional due process-oriented approach, both in
its protection of expressive conduct even before proceedings have
begun, and in its focus on the quality of information—the arguments,
theories and facts—essential to the adjudicative process.
B. A Test Case:
Restricting Attorney’s Fees in Successful Prisoner’s Rights Actions
The constitutionality of limitations on the availability of attorney’s
fees for prisoner’s rights cases presents an illuminating opportunity
to explore the implications of a reinvigorated First Amendment right
to pursue redress of constitutional injuries. The Prison Litigation
277
Reform Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d),
278
“significantly limits” the attorney’s fees that may be awarded in a
279
civil rights action brought by an inmate.
This statutory provision,
which to date has been challenged unsuccessfully under the Equal

275. See In re Primus, 426 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
437-38 (1963).
276. The right of due process during court proceedings generally is understood as
the client’s right, not the lawyer’s. In Velazquez, for example, the client was free to
raise constitutional claims on her own or hire a private attorney to assist. See Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 556 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that restriction did not stop a litigant from hiring a private, non-LSC attorney to
argue constitutional claims regarding welfare benefits). Under such circumstances,
it is not easy to see how the individual is denied an opportunity to be heard. By
contrast, the lawyer has an independent First Amendment interest in engaging in
speech separate and apart from his client. Id.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
278. Collins v. Montgomery County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 176 F.3d 679, 681
(3d Cir. 1999).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). The PLRA substantially altered the landscape for
bringing prisoner’s rights cases by requiring inmates to exhaust available
administrative remedies even if the grievance procedure at issue could not possibly
provide the relief sought. Id. § 1997e(a)(1). The statute also denies in forma pauperis
status to inmates who have had three or more lawsuits or appeals dismissed, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and authorizes dismissal of damages claims
that are not accompanied by any “physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
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280

Protection Clause, restricts the recovery of fees to no greater than
“150 percent of the hourly rate established . . . for payment of
281
court-appointed counsel,” and where damages are obtained, the
PLRA imposes an absolute limit on the amount of fees that a
successful attorney may recover to 150 percent of the monetary
282
judgment.
Unlike most court rules that authorize the dismissal of actions or
the imposition of sanctions for bringing suits for an improper
283
purpose, the PLRA’s fees cap does not directly penalize the inmate
for asserting a constitutional claim. Rather, by depriving attorneys of
value for their work, the law discourages attorneys from taking on
prisoners as clients, and creates disincentives to perform the work
competently when representation is undertaken.
While the
284
entitlement to fees is ascribed to the “prevailing party,” in practice
fees are awarded to the prevailing party’s counsel if the plaintiff has
retained one, and to no one if the case is pursued pro se (neither an
attorney who handles his own case pro se nor a non-lawyer is entitled
285
to fees).
Nevertheless, the sweeping rule substantially affects an
inmate’s ability to litigate complex constitutional claims by reducing
the only incentive for a competent attorney to take up an inmate’s
cause. Hence, the PLRA’s fees cap presents a problem for theories of
access under which the right of access would end when a claim is
286
filed.
C. Failing to Appreciate the Speech-Curbing Impact of the Cap
In upholding this limitation on available attorney’s fees, some
courts have denied that a “fundamental right,” which warrants
287
heightened judicial scrutiny, is at stake; others have mouthed the

280. Every constitutional challenge to the fees cap thus far has been rejected by
the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2000);
Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2000); Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996
(9th Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit was divided evenly on this question, leaving intact
the lower court’s rejection of the constitutional attack. See Collins, 176 F.3d at 686.
281. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).
282. Id.
283. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
284. See 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) (awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing party for civil
rights actions).
285. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1991) (holding that a pro se litigant is
not entitled to fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act, regardless of
whether the litigant is a lawyer or a non-lawyer). See also The Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
286. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 35, at 683 (defining right to mean
only initial access).
287. See Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir.) (concluding that
“prisoners are not a suspect class, . . . and plaintiffs have not alleged that a
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words, but in practice have diluted their meaning by failing to treat
288
The decisions are flawed on
access to the courts as a basic right.
several counts. First, these rulings have relied on an overly narrow
understanding of the right of access to mean little more than the
289
ability to file intelligible legal pleadings with the court. The courts
have employed the most cramped concept of court access available in
the case law, with little attempt to harmonize the different lines of
cases or weigh the values at stake.
In none of these cases has the court acknowledged the value of the
anti-government expression presented by inmates’ lawsuits. Nor have
the lower courts heeded the Supreme Court’s admonition that the
assertion of civil rights claims, with which 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988
290
are exclusively concerned, stands on special footing under the First
Amendment because it constitutes expression going to the very core
291
of the judicial function. The diminution of this fundamental right
strains the notions that access must be meaningful, that rules should
not negatively affect the ability of individuals to present claims of
292
constitutional injury without “distorting” the system, and that
lawyers are critical to the proper adjudication of constitutional
questions (i.e., Congress’ longstanding policy that the availability of
293
fees is crucial to the vindication of civil rights).
These courts commit a second error by inexplicably imposing a
higher standard for stating a First Amendment injury. The courts
have mistakenly required that inmates show that the fee cap “make[s]
294
it impossible for a prisoner to secure the services of a lawyer.”
Cognizable injury occurs when government unjustifiably burdens the

fundamental right is at issue”).
288. See, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 668 n.3 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
tension between PLRA’s cap on attorney’s fees and fundamental right of access to
courts, but ultimately upholding fee cap under rational basis scrutiny).
289. See, e.g., Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that right of
access is “narrow in scope” and that the fees cap “does not implicate the right of
access to the courts in any cognizable way”).
290. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (discussing elements of a cause of
action for violation of civil rights by a state actor); id. § 1988 (awarding attorney’s fees
in civil rights cases).
291. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544-45 (2001) (criticizing
restriction imposed by the statute in question, as insulating the laws of the legislative
branch from judicial scrutiny).
292. Id. at 544.
293. The encouragement of private attorneys to take civil rights cases is a policy
“Congress considered of the highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968). As the Court explained, “[i]f successful plaintiffs were
routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a
position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the
federal courts.” Id.
294. Boivin, 225 F.3d at 43.
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295

exercise of a constitutional right, or when official action poses a
296
One need not
real likelihood of chilling protected expression.
demonstrate conclusively that the right cannot be exercised in order
297
to prevail.
Third, in upholding the cap, courts have accepted the
government’s justifications for imposing the cap on prisoners without
the requisite skepticism. Granted, much of the cause for this
situation can be attributed to the use of rational basis review in the
first place, which provides that the government “need not actually
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its
298
[decision],” and asks whether “there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational justification for the
299
classification.”
300
But the rational basis test still demands reasonable explanations.
Thus far, courts have uniformly accepted the government’s
301
explanations, even when they defy logic. For example, by the plain
terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, fees are available only to civil rights
plaintiffs who prevail. Therefore, limiting the amount of fees

295. See, e.g., Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a
First Amendment violation where plaintiff was threatened with revocation of
privileges by prison officials for continuous complaints about the state of prison law
library).
296. See id. (holding that threat of revocation of privileges chilled inmates’
expression of complaints).
297. It is quite possible that courts have confused the distinction between
affirmative accommodations that the right of access may require, which are narrower in
scope, and the right to be free from restrictions that unduly restrict access, which is
broader in scope. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that right
of access to courts required providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
assistance of legal professionals).
298. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d
840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that government “may rely entirely on rational
speculation unsupported by any evidence or empirical data”) (citing FCC v. Beach
Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
299. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320.
300. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (explaining that rational basis
standard “is not a toothless one”); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974)
(holding that distinction based on illegitimacy was not reasonably related to any
government interest of avoiding spurious benefits claims); see generally Lynn S.
Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s Fees, 89 CAL. L. REV. 999 (2001) (arguing
that PLRA’s limitation on attorney’s fees for prevailing prisoners should fail rational
basis test); Karen M. Klotz, Comment, The Price of Civil Rights: The Prison Litigation
Reform Act’s Attorney’s Fee-Cap Provision As a Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws, 73
TEMP. L. REV. 759 (2000) (same).
301. See Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 702-03 (8th Cir. 2001) (accepting
government’s explanation that PLRA fee caps discouraged frivolous lawsuits); Walker
v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 669-70 (6th Cir. 2001) (accepting government’s explanation
that fee caps protect public fisc); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (8th Cir.
1998) (accepting government’s explanation that fee caps level playing field between
incarcerated and non-incarcerated litigants).
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available to winners can have no appreciable effect in deterring
frivolous § 1983 suits.
Even where courts have recognized that the government’s
arguments are on shaky grounds, they have nevertheless felt bound to
302
uphold the fees cap because of their use of the rational basis test.
In minimizing the practical effect of the provision on indigent
prisoners’ ability to find competent attorneys to pursue well-founded
claims, courts have felt free to engage in pure speculation rather than
303
any actual fact finding. For example, in discounting the problem of
over-deterrence that the fee caps pose, i.e., discouraging attorneys
from taking on colorable claims or providing competent
representation, the First Circuit declared: “We doubt that a lawyer
who believes that a prisoner has a meritorious claim for damages will
304
be deterred by that limitation.” The court disingenuously reached
its conclusion by blurring the different incentive structures in civil
rights cases and ordinary civil lawsuits, announcing that the civil
rights attorney receives “150% more than the norm in civil
305
litigation.”
If one were to accept this reasoning, any effect of the
law on one’s ability to challenge existing law could be brushed aside
simply because the successful civil rights plaintiff is entitled to some
measure of fees.
The proper inquiry would be to ask whether the fees cap
discourages private attorneys from taking prisoners’ rights cases or
impairs their work when they accept such cases, a question that turns
on a comparison of the conduct of civil rights attorneys before and
after the enactment of the PLRA restrictions (not a comparison
between capped civil rights attorneys and civil attorneys who engage
in non-civil rights legal work). By equating dissimilar categories of
cases, the First Circuit and courts embracing its analysis have
misunderstood entirely the impact of the law on dissident speech.
D. Burdening the Exercise of a Fundamental Right
Under the theory of access set forth in this Article, the fees cap
chills the exercise of two related, fundamental First Amendment

302. See Hadix, 230 F.3d at 846 (characterizing prisoner’s legal complaints about
fees cap as “well founded criticisms”); Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir.
1999) (accepting at face value government’s “speculation” that limitation on fees will
curtail frivolous prisoner’s suits).
303. See Madrid, 190 F.3d at 996 (arguing that it is “certainly conceivable” that
prisoners are involved in a “disproportionate number” of suits which lack merit when
compared to the rest of population, and that court need not undergo a search for
facts or empirical data to confirm this theory).
304. Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2000).
305. Id.
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rights: the right to seek redress of constitutional violations, and the
corollary right to seek assistance from, and associate with,
sympathetic persons who are able to articulate effectively the message
306
As in the case of individuals on public
of constitutional reform.
assistance, restrictions on legal assistance impair aggrieved prisoners’
abilities to obtain competent counsel to challenge government
authority and affect the quality of the representation received by
reducing any incentive for an attorney to expend the resources
307
necessary to investigate and litigate the claims effectively. The fees
cap, as even the courts have candidly acknowledged, “affects how
308
Such a burden on a litigant’s ability to
claims are presented.”
articulate his challenge to government policy threatens to create a
two-tiered system for civil rights cases: inmates’ constitutional claims,
which are articulated in a less thoughtful manner, and the civil rights
lawsuits in other contexts, which on the whole would likely be
309
presented more completely and intelligently.
The impairment of an inmate’s ability to present his claims of
constitutional wrongdoing, moreover, runs counter to the broader
310
policies animating the federal fee-shifting statute. Section 1988 was
explicitly “designed to give [aggrieved] persons effective access to the
311
judicial process,” many of whom, as the Supreme Court has

306. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 253, at 55 (explaining that “[i]t is immaterial that the
benefits might have been abolished altogether; the point is that, having been
provided generally, such benefits may not be withdrawn simply because the
designated rights have been, or are being, exercised”).
307. See Madrid, 190 F.3d at 995 (acknowledging that fee cap deters attorneys from
accepting prisoners’ rights cases, but claiming that it would only “restrict prisoners’
access to the most sought-after counsel who insist on their going rate for
representation”); see also Boivin, 225 F.3d at 43 (adopting this speculative reasoning).
Content-based rules that affect the availability or competency of counsel in this
context raise First Amendment concerns. In striking down the rule restricting
challenges to existing welfare rules, the Velazquez Court explained that in many cases,
clients would not be able to find alternative lawyers, and that there would be “no
alternative source for the client to receive vital information respecting constitutional
and statutory rights bearing upon claimed benefits.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001).
308. Boivin, 225 F.3d at 45.
309. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545 (warning against rules that create a two-tiered
system where quality of representation would affect presentation of constitutional
claims). Because the attorney’s fees restriction implicates a fundamental right
protected by the First Amendment—the right to engage in constitutional litigation
free from arbitrary or unjustified government restrictions—strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause also would be appropriate.
310. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976) (stating that because the effective
enforcement of federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private
citizens, the judicial remedy will remain a “meaningless right” unless victims can
afford legal counsel to present their claims to courts).
311. Id.
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312

acknowledged, “might have little or no money.” Congress enacted
the law with the full understanding that “effective enforcement
313
depends largely on the efforts of private citizens,” and in an effort
to “preserv[e] access to the courts and encourag[e] public interest
314
litigation” to be undertaken by competent counsel.
Understandably, most private attorneys have shied away from
taking prisoner’s rights cases, which generally are difficult to
315
investigate, costly to pursue, and rarely are financially rewarding.
In many cases, damages for constitutional torts are of low or nominal
316
Therefore, in most cases the private attorney will expect to
value.
317
In
recoup little, if anything, from a contingency-fee arrangement.
light of these circumstances, the prospect of recovering fees under
§ 1988 represents the only realistic way that a competent, private
attorney can afford to represent an inmate, much less expend
318
adequate resources on his case.
The fees cap makes it even more
difficult to encourage competent counsel to pursue prisoner’s rights
319
cases.
Other factors weigh in favor of evaluating the fees cap under the
First Amendment’s more restrictive standards. Like other minority
groups without access to traditional avenues of political power,
inmates comprise a discrete category of individuals without the

312. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 108 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Congress intended to give those without financial resources
the ability to act as “private attorney[s] general” to enforce civil rights laws); accord
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (same).
313. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1.
314. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 110 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
315. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 370 n.2 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“An attorney’s decision to invest time and energy in a
civil rights suit necessarily involves a complex balance of factors, including the
likelihood of success, the amount of labor necessary to prosecute the case to
completion, and the potential recovery.”).
316. See Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 2000). In Boivin, the plaintiffinmate lost consciousness after being locked in a restraint chair with a towel covering
his mouth. Id. After a full trial, the jury rendered a verdict in the complainant’s
favor, but awarded only $1.00 in nominal damages. Id. Although the plaintiff’s
attorneys’ fees reached $ 3,892.50, under the cap, they were entitled to only $1.50 for
their hard work. Id.; see also JOHN BOSTON, PRISONERS’ SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL
215-16 (1995) (asserting that most damage awards for substantive violations of one’s
rights typically are very modest compared to time and costs expended by an attorney,
unless violations are accompanied by serious bodily harm or dehumanizing
treatment).
317. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (discussing fee recovery’s role in counsel’s evaluation of whether to
represent a potential civil rights plaintiff).
318. See id. at 568 (explaining that Congress attached fee-shifting provisions to
statutes that typically generate little or no damages).
319. See id. (“The strategy of the fee-shifting provisions is to attract competent
counsel to selected federal cases by ensuring that if they prevail, counsel will receive
fees commensurable with what they could obtain in other litigation.”).
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means to effect legislative change (or oppose change hostile to their
320
They do not form any natural constituency and
interests).
therefore provide no political benefit to their advocates; nor is any
price paid by leaders who vote for laws that abridge prisoners’
321
rights.
As the late Professor Thomas Emerson once explained, “[t]he
expansion of organization in our society has left the unorganized
322
The
sectors peculiarly vulnerable to infringement of their rights.”
inmate, a classic “deviant” whom the modern state separates, isolates,
and controls absolutely, must seek relief from non-traditional
323
quarters.
Even more so than other political minorities for whom
some measure of progress has been made in improving accountability
and influence, the courts remain for these despised individuals “the
324
sole practical avenue open to . . . petition for redress of grievances.”
E. Restricting Fees for Prevailing Prisoners as Content-Based Regulation
One might object that the Constitution does not guarantee a
litigant an entitlement to a skilled lawyer to pursue civil causes of
action and that, additionally, there is no particular constitutional
325
right to be compensated when a party prevails. After all, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 is a statutory grant of attorney’s fees, and in the absence of
such a fee-shifting mechanism, the default American Rule would
simply leave the expenses of litigation where they lie without

320. In emphasizing the political vulnerability of the incarcerated, I have
deliberately avoided the test for suspect classification articulated in the famous
Carolene Products footnote. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) (suggesting strict scrutiny for laws affecting “discrete and insular”
minorities). But see Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
716 (1985) (arguing that discreteness and insularity are not necessarily the best
indicators of political powerlessness). I am comforted by the fact that the First
Amendment cases have not employed the narrow “discrete and insular” test in
determining whose speech and access to the court are worth protecting, but have
recognized a general policy of protecting contrariants from all walks of life, even
those who seek to engage in distasteful or socially questionable expression.
321. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(explaining that prison inmates are “voteless, politically unpopular, and socially
threatening”); see also Barry R. Bell, Note, Prisoner’s Rights, Institutional Needs, and the
Burger Court, 72 VA. L. REV. 161, 190 (1986) (asserting that prisoners are isolated
from public view, regarded with distaste by political community, and exert little or no
political leverage of their own).
322. EMERSON, supra note 29, at 37.
323. See id. at 38 (asserting that “deviant individuals” are forced to pursue their
interests through judicial process because of a lack of access to traditional avenues of
influence).
324. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
325. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(reaffirming the “American Rule” whereby each party bears its own attorney’s fees
unless there is a statute providing for fees).
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326

offending the Constitution. Even if the fees cap restricts “speech,”
one could conceivably argue that the cap seeks to control only the
327
secondary effects of the protected expression.
The main flaw in this argument, however, is that for no other
category of speakers has the government limited the availability of
attorney’s fees in this fashion.
While there is no general
constitutional entitlement to counsel to pursue civil rights claims (let
alone to one who is well paid), Congress chose to provide for fees to
328
facilitate constitutional litigation.
The First Amendment requires
that this entitlement be provided on an equal basis unless justified by
329
As Professor Tribe explains, “[e]ven the
a compelling purpose.
withdrawal of a gratuity—whether in the form of a welfare payment
that a state is not independently required to make or in the form of
an extension of court jurisdiction that Congress is not independently
compelled to provide—may be forbidden if it penalizes a separately
330
secured right.”
The PLRA imposes a content-based classification of speech in that
it distinguishes between the lawsuits initiated by inmate-dissidents
and other kinds of grievances based on the content of the speech—
331
namely, “prisoners’ suits.”
Even a cursory examination of the
PLRA’s provisions reveal that prisoner litigation, a protected form of
332
anti-government expression, is the target of these restrictions. The
government itself concedes that it has singled out prisoner rights
litigation, insisting that it seeks to reduce the overall volume of legal
333
filings by prisoners.

326. Id.
327. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994) (stating that
as a general rule, laws that distinguish based on favored or disfavored ideas or views
are content-based); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(explaining that government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral so
long as, inter alia, it is justified without reference to content of regulated speech).
328. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976) (stating that Congress intended to
encourage suits based on violations of federal laws guaranteeing civil and
constitutional rights).
329. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (asserting that to survive strict scrutiny, a content-based
regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly
tailored to achieve that end).
330. TRIBE, supra note 253, at 273.
331. Perhaps the most powerful evidence of a content-based restriction on
constitutional litigation is that the cap applies explicitly to “any action brought by a
prisoner . . . in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d)(1).
332. See Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that PLRA
specifically targeted prisoner litigation in restricting attorney’s fees).
333. See id. at 41 (“Congress enacted the PLRA out of a concern that prisoner
litigation . . . was wasting taxpayer money and clogging the courts . . . thus reducing
the overall number of prisoner suits and easing the perceived burden of prisoner
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The limitation on fees should be treated as a content-based
regulation of protected speech for the added reason that it was
explicitly enacted because of the effect of the speech upon the
listener—here, the government institutions about whose policies the
plaintiff complains of in court. The federal government wished to
shield state and local entities from prisoners’ lawsuits and reduce the
334
federal courts’ supervision of errant institutions. Although there is
no First Amendment protection for frivolous lawsuits, this particular
rule sweeps far too broadly to include obviously meritorious cases, as
well as colorable claims that eventually may be decided adversely to
335
No similar across-the-board restriction on the
the plaintiff.
availability of fees has been imposed on other kinds of civil rights
336
actions.
For these reasons, a more skeptical evaluation of the
restriction is warranted.
337
As for the “secondary effects” doctrine, it is simply inapplicable.
Even if one accepts at face value the government’s explanations for
338
adopting the law, the provision is directed at speech itself, even
though some of the speech captured by the rule, i.e., patently
frivolous lawsuits, is not protected. Moreover, the rationale may
justify speech restrictions only where the actual effect on speech is
incidental. The principle should find no traction here, as the fees

litigation on the justice system.”); see also Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 993 (9th
Cir. 1999) (explaining that PLRA “limit[ed] the amount of attorney’s fees that can
be awarded to prisoners’ counsel, thereby reducing the burden that prisoners’ suits
have on the public fisc”).
334. See infra note 347 and accompanying text (describing Congress’ desire to
reduce judicial supervision of state and local prisons).
335. See Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that
government argued that the fees cap was enacted not only to discourage frivolous
cases, but also to “reduce trivial or inconsequential suits”); see id. at 845 (stating that
the PLRA intended to “decreas[e] marginal or trivial lawsuits”); Boivin, 225 F.3d at
46 (conceding that fees cap may discourage filing of “low-value suits”); H.R. REP. NO.
104-21, at 28 (1995) (stating that fee cap “will discourage burdensome litigation of
insubstantial claims where the prisoner can establish a technical violation of a federal
right but he suffered no real harm from the violation”). The Court has repeatedly
held that the right of court access cannot be infringed where litigants in good faith
pursue constitutional claims. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378
(1971).
336. See Boivin, 225 F.3d at 39 (noting that by enacting the PLRA, Congress
deviated from the general pattern of providing attorney’s fees to prevailing civil
rights litigants by explicitly choosing to limit the fees that courts can award to a
prisoner’s lawyer in a civil rights case).
337. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (asserting
that a content-based regulation will be considered content-neutral if it was enacted
for the purpose of controlling the secondary effects of the speech and not to restrict
speech).
338. See Boivin, 225 F.3d at 41 (stating that Congress enacted the PLRA out of the
concern that prisoner litigation was wasting taxpayer money and clogging courts
because much of it was considered frivolous).
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cap is reasonably likely to deter or frustrate legitimate dissident
speech within the legal system.
F. Familiar Terrain:
Demanding a Powerful Government Interest and Narrow Tailoring
The PLRA should receive exacting review by the Court and be
upheld only if the government can narrowly tailor its restrictions and
put forth a compelling government interest, because the fees cap
constitutes a limitation on a mode of speech rather than an
affirmative accommodation. The government has argued that the
cap is rational because it discourages prisoners from lodging frivolous
339
claims, that it “levels the playing field” by imposing additional
disincentives to prisoners, who unlike the average civil litigant, have
both the time and energy to file frivolous lawsuits repeatedly in the
340
hopes of a windfall, that it reduces federal courts’ intrusion into the
341
342
management of prisons, and that it protects the public fisc.
Under the more demanding test, sheer “speculation” by lawmakers
that the fees cap will reduce frivolous prisoners’ suits simply will not
be adequate. While reducing the volume of patently frivolous
343
litigation is a sufficient government interest in the abstract, a
speech-centered model would require Congress to show that private
lawyers pursuing unfounded claims on behalf of inmates actually has
contributed to the sharp rise in the volume of frivolous prisoners’
344
suits. No such hard evidence supported Congress’ decision to enact
the fees cap.
Many of the remaining goals advanced by the federal government
in support of the limitation, such as protecting the public treasury or
345
“reducing judicial intervention into the management of prisons,”

339. See Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 702-03 (8th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with
government’s argument that PLRA cap on attorney’s fees was rationally related to
government interest in discouraging frivolous lawsuits).
340. See Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing how
PLRA fee provisions limit opportunities of prisoner litigants to file suit to those of
“other litigants in the federal court”).
341. See Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 677 (6th Cir. 2001) (presenting, yet finding
unpersuasive, government’s argument that fees cap prevents federal court intrusion
into the management of prisons).
342. See id. at 669-70 (holding that fee caps in PLRA protect the public fisc, which
is a legitimate government interest); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843-45
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding that fee caps are a valid means to prevent frivolous lawsuits
by prisoners, thereby protecting treasury).
343. See Hadix, 230 F.3d at 845 (explaining that Congress believed that there has
been an explosion of prisoner civil rights litigation that has burdened prison
administration, the state treasury, and the federal judiciary).
344. Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 1999).
345. Hadix, 230 F.3d at 844.
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should be rejected outright. Saving money does not constitute a
346
compelling justification for abridging one’s constitutional rights.
Moreover, Congress’ chosen solution strikes where its regulatory
interest is weakest (succesfful actions) or where the state has
voluntarily assented to the jurisdiction of the courts (and therefore
needs no protection).
Worse, it slips perilously close to
unconstitutionally interfering with the federal judiciary’s Article III
authority and penalizing inmates, as a class of persons, from
347
exercising their right to seek redress for constitutional harms.
The answers are more lucid when it comes to the question of
whether the fees cap is narrowly tailored. As the nervousness
exhibited by some of the courts examining this question strongly
348
suggests, the elixir mixed by Congress simply does not cure the
diagnosed illness. Claims resulting in an award of fees are, by
definition under § 1988, neither frivolous nor insubstantial, because
349
the statute only awards fees to the prevailing plaintiffs. Restricting
the amount of fees attorneys can recover in successful suits,
therefore, can have no material reduction in the amount of frivolous
suits actually brought in the federal courts, which inmates remain
350
free to do pro se. This is particularly true if, as the supporters of the
legislation urge, the underlying causes of the rise in frivolous
prisoner’s suits are: (1) low opportunity costs because prisoners have
an unlimited amount of time on their hands and (2) low transaction

346. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (“Citizens may not be
compelled to forgo their Constitutional rights because officials . . . desire to save
money.”); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1956) (holding that state
requirement of transcript fee impermissibly blocked indigent’s access to judicial
process).
347. Perhaps aware of the grave consequences, the Sixth Circuit declined to
address whether reducing the involvement of the courts in the administration of
prisons was a rational basis for enacting the law. Hadix, 230 F.3d at 846 n.7; see also
141 CONG. REC. S14,611, 14,626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(declaring that “[t]hese guidelines will work to restrain Federal judges . . . who have
used these complaints to micromanage state and local prison systems”); id.
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (asserting that “the courts have gone too far in
micromanaging our Nation’s prisons”); Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of
Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866, S. 930 and H.R. 667 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 3-7 (1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (stating
that prisoners, lawyers, and unelected judges have replaced the legislators in
controlling the character of prisons); id. at 26-32 (statement of William P. Barr,
Former U.S. Attorney General) (asserting that judicial micromanagement of prison
system was hamstringing state and local officials managing prison resources).
348. See Hadix, 230 F.3d at 847 (acknowledging that “the means that Congress
employed do not tightly fit the ends it sought to achieve”).
349. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992) (holding that plaintiff does
not prevail within meaning of § 1988 unless “actual relief on the merits of his claim
alters the legal relationship between the parties”).
350. See Hadix, 230 F.3d at 845 (recognizing that some prisoners will continue
litigation of their claims even without assistance of an attorney).
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costs to engage in litigation because fees and costs are often waived.
The restriction on the availability of counsel’s fees, which does not
actually penalize the inmate who files a frivolous action or affects an
entitlement that would accrue to him directly, cannot conceivably
curb the pro se inmate’s wasteful behavior. Indeed, the proponents of
the legislation were well aware that the vast majority of civil rights
cases brought by prisoners in the federal courts were litigated pro se,
352
and not with the assistance of counsel. On the other hand, insofar
as one might be able to predict the cap’s effect on the exercise of
protected speech, it is just as likely that the law will deter more private
attorneys from taking on meritorious cases with a lower projected
payoff.
Even assuming that it is possible for such an ill-conceived approach
to reduce frivolous inmate lawsuits, the strict scrutiny standard would
put the proposal to the test by requiring the government to come
forward with: (1) concrete evidence that attorneys actually pursue
meritless prisoners’ suits in the hope of a big payoff; and (2) a factual
basis for believing that the restriction would materially reduce the
number of baseless inmate filings in the federal courts. The current
legislative record consists entirely of statistics reflecting a rise in the
total number of prisoner filings, from which the legislators have
353
drawn unreasonable assumptions,
and a handful of widely354
circulated anecdotes about inmates suing over silly grievances.
If the government is taken at its word that it honestly desires to
reduce frivolous lawsuits rather than suppress prisoners’ lawful antigovernment expression, the government still must resort to less
restrictive mechanisms directed at those who actually file frivolous
355
cases, rather than enact restrictions on all prisoner-plaintiffs.

351. See Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that “low
opportunity costs” may lead prisoners to file more frivolous lawsuits than public in
general); see also Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (asserting that pro se civil rights litigation has become a “recreational
activity” for state prisoners); 141 CONG. REC. S7,526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (stating that for prisoners, there is “no cost to bring a suit”
because courts routinely waive filing fee and prisoners have all the “necessities of life
supplied” to them).
352. See 141 CONG. REC. S7,526 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (explaining that between
July and October 1987 “section 1983 prisoner appeals prosecuted without counsel
were [the Fifth Circuit’s] largest single category of cases” and further noting that the
number of these cases stands at almost 22%, with the next largest category, diversity
cases, standing at 16% of the court’s docket).
353. See 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(insisting that majority of prisoner suits were frivolous because of 39,000 lawsuits
filed in federal courts by inmates, only 3.1% reached trial).
354. See id. (claiming that prisoners have sued for being served chunky rather than
creamy peanut butter and for being denied the use of a Nintendo Gameboy).
355. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) (striking down, on Equal
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Government-defendants already have at their disposal a plethora of
tools to handle frivolous lawsuits, including the vigorous use of
356
motions to dismiss and/or summary judgment, sanctions under
357
358
Rule 11, existing federal law, as well as the court’s inherent
authority to oversee its own work. Furthermore, other elements of
the PLRA arguably are more closely tethered to the objective of
359
discouraging frivolous filings by penalizing misconduct directly. All
of these methods are far less intrusive than an across-the-board
limitation on fees, and are more reasonably calculated to address the
360
problems identified by the government.
Officials should be
required to show that these less restrictive methods of curbing the
disfavored conduct do not work before resorting to blanket rules that
affect all prisoners’ abilities to secure attorneys and present colorable
361
claims.
The method that Congress used to fulfill its professed goal of
deterring frivolous filings in this case can be closely analogized to
other types of laws enacted to attack certain categories of
362
unprotected speech, but which cast far too wide a net.

Protection grounds, transcription fee requirement that “impos[ed] a financial
obligation only upon inmates of institutions, . . . inevitably burden[ing] many whose
appeals, though unsuccessful, were not frivolous, and leav[ing] many whose appeals
may have been frivolous indeed”).
356. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal of a case for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
357. See id. at 11 (exposing attorney to possible sanctions for filing a frivolous
lawsuit).
358. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (authorizing federal courts to sanction a party or
his counsel for engaging in “unreasonabl[e] and vexatious” litigation).
359. See id. § 1915(g) (stating that under PLRA prisoners who file more than three
frivolous actions will be denied in forma pauperis status for subsequent claims as a
penalty for abusing the right to court access). I leave for another day an analysis of
the constitutionality of such provisions, which single out inmates for these special
kinds of penalties, but simply note that Congress is well equipped to enact less
restrictive solutions.
360. The Court made this point in Boddie when it firmly rejected the argument
that the state’s interest in preventing frivolous lawsuits and allocating scarce
resources justified the imposition of filing fees where constitutional rights are at
stake. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971). The Boddie Court
noted that there were alternatives to fee and cost requirements “as a means for
conserving the time of courts and protecting parties from frivolous litigation, such as
penalties for false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious prosecution or
abuse of process, to mention only a few.” Id.
361. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(asserting that in order for a content-based speech restriction to withstand strict
scrutiny, it must be narrowly tailored and employ the least restrictive means
available).
362. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878-79 (1997) (invalidating provisions
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 as overly broad content-based
restrictions on speech); ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(issuing preliminary injunction against enforcement of criminal statute prohibiting
Internet transmissions that falsely identified sender because it would hamper access
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Consequently, the law poses an intolerable risk of chilling protected
363
In this instance, the restriction on attorney’s fees present
dissent.
dangers that are interrelated: fewer competent attorneys will be
available to assist prisoners in articulating valid constitutional claims,
and when counsel is retained, there are strong reasons for lawyers to
give these cases less attention and resources than they require.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have outlined an alternative way of thinking about
the right of court access. I have tried to move beyond an entryfocused notion of access to one that is rooted in political theory and
more concerned with the goal of meaningful access. In describing a
speech-centered right of access, I have tried to demonstrate that the
assertion of one’s constitutional rights is equivalent to the expression
of anti-government sentiment.
The project had a descriptive
component and a normative one. I endeavored to show that
constitutional litigation is most fruitfully understood within the prism
of contrariant speech protected by the First Amendment. I also
sought to demonstrate that this makes considerable sense because
the structure by which constitutional values are made concrete—i.e.,
the essential expressive features of the civil rights plaintiff’s
transformative project and the adjudicative apparatus—reinforces the
plaintiff’s status as a dissident.
Popular disenchantment with the structural model of adjudication
threatens to erode the institutions, rules, and legal methods that
allow the federal courts to fulfill their essential function of
safeguarding the forum in which our individual rights are given
tangible meaning. Now, more than ever, we should strive to
recapture the essentially anti-government nature of constitutional
litigation. My hope is that in acknowledging the norms-challenging
character of constitutional litigation firmly within First Amendment
jurisprudence, courts would more fully appreciate the truly political
nature of this form of expression, and return the fundamental right
of court access to its proper place in the constitutional order.
Sensitized to the peculiar nature of constitutional litigation as speech,
courts might then be better equipped to confront the unique

to constitutionally protected speech).
363. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (asserting that the “governmental interest in
protecting children from harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults” on the Internet); see also Miller, 977
F. Supp. at 1233 (explaining that statutes restricting speech require precision
drafting to prevent an unconstitutionally broad category regulation).
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problems posed by government efforts to burden, limit, or frustrate
citizens’ efforts to invoke their individual rights. Let the debate over
the ideal of court access begin anew.
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